Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas

Titel: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas

Stichwort: Von der Identität zur Konfrontation; Notwendigkeit des inneres Wortes beim Menschen; Unmöglichkeit d. Beweises bei Gott

Kurzinhalt: quidditas rei -> res: humantias -> homo; understanding moves from identity with its preconceptual object to confrontation with its conceived object

Textausschnitt: The essential necessity of inner words in our intellects is the necessity of effecting the transition from the preconceptual quidditas rei materialis, first to the res, secondly to the res particularis, thirdly to the res particularis existens. The transition from quidditas rei to res, say from humanitas to homo, occurs in conception, in which there emerges intellect's natural knowledge of ens. In virtue of this step, understanding moves from identity with its preconceptual object to confrontation with its conceived object;b but as yet the object is only object of thought. The second step is a reflection on phantasm that enables one to mean, though not understand nor explanatorily define, the material singular. In this step intellect moves from a universal to a particular object of thought. Finally, by a reflective act of understanding that sweeps through all relevant data, sensible and intelligible, present and remembered, and grasps understanding's proportion to the universe as well, there is uttered the existential judgment through which one knows concrete reality.
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We turn to our second question. Why cannot natural reason demonstrate the existence of the divine Word from the premise of divine selfknowledge? First, the demonstration cannot be effected by contrasting the proper object of understanding with the divine essence. God is simply intelligible. He is pure form identical with existence. There is no distinction between his essence or his existence or his intellect or his understanding. There is not even a distinction' between his esse naturale and his esse intelligibile. Secondly, the demonstration cannot be effected by arguing that without an inner word there would be no confrontation between subject and object. For one cannot demonstrate that such confrontation is essential to knowledge. Primarily and essentially, knowing is by identity. The natural light of reason will never get beyond that identity in demonstrating the nature of self-knowledge in the infinite simplicity of God.