Datenbank/Lektüre


Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Understanding and Being

Titel: Understanding and Being

Stichwort: Kant und die praktische Vernunft; Maréchal und Finalität

Kurzinhalt: falsche Erkenntnistheorie, doch hohe Moral: Stoa, Kant; so Kant can attribute validity to the ideas of reason from the viewpoint of action that he I cannot from the viewpoint of knowledge.

Textausschnitt: It is interesting to note that the stoics had a very elevated moral doctrine, while in their epistemology and their views of reality they were materialists. It illustrates the point that one can have self-appropriation and grasp its implications in the moral field and not do so in the more complicated field of cognitional theory and metaphysics.
()
In Kant, one has something similar: a theory of knowledge that excludes, to a great extent, knowledge of reality and, at the same time, an ethical doctrine of remarkable elevation.
()
In the Critique of Pure Reason the conditions for a possible experience are not the same as the conditions for a possible course of action. A possible course of action regards something in the future, something you are going to do, not something you know. The conditions are not exactly the same, and so Kant can attribute validity to the ideas of reason or the ideals of reason from the viewpoint of action that he I cannot from the viewpoint of knowledge.
()
But at least part of Maréchal's idea seems to have been that to introduce finality in the intellect would be to confer on speculative intellect the same type of validity that Kant acknowledges in practical intellect. But because of the role that Kant ascribes to intuition in knowledge, he cannot at the same time give primacy to judgment, and he cannot at the same time give primacy to a finalistic view of knowledge, namely, that knowledge is something we move towards, not something we build upon intuitions.

____________________________

Home Sitemap Lonergan/Literatur Grundkurs/Philosophie Artikel/Texte Datenbank/Lektüre Links/Aktuell/Galerie Impressum/Kontakt