Autor: Vertin, Michael -- Mehrere Autoren: Lonergan Workshop, Volume 8

Buch: Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Titel: Michael Vertin, Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Stichwort: Philosophie der Philosophien; empirische Grundlegung (empirical foundationalism)

Kurzinhalt: (i) If valid knowing occurs in me, then (epistemically accessible) reality exists, but the distinctive features of the latter are IN NO WAY PREFIGURED by the distinctive features of the former; (ii) that assertion is based upon EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE and ...

Textausschnitt: i. empirical foundationalism

236b What distinguishes philosophers in our first major group from those in the three further groups is their stand on the basic epistemological-metaphysical issue. The first group has a variety of subgroups, but they all maintain at least three things in common. First, they all contend that, although valid knowing surely manifests reality, the characteristic traits of knowing do not necessarily foreshadow the characteristic traits of reality in any way. Nothing at all can be said about reality save in and through one's actual knowing of it; and any effort to interpret a priori claims as radically distinct from empirical ones but still referring to reality is wrongheaded from the start. Second, the ultimate evidence to which they appeal in asserting the first point is evidence extrinsic to their making of that assertion itself. That is to say, they argue in effect that their view of the relation between knowing and reality must be accepted because it is uniquely solidary with the presuppositions or conclusions of the natural sciences, or because it is bound up with what is required for human practice's attainment of beneficial results, or because it alone is consistent with certain crucial religious beliefs, or for some other "extrinsic" reason. Third, they agree that making those first two assertions is methodologically the most fundamental of all philosophical moves, constitutes in a general way the sole acceptable starting point of sane philosophizing, and establishes the framework within which all other philosophical assertions are to be interpreted and assessed. We may denominate this three-part claim "empirical foundationalism"1 and summarize it as follows:

A. 3a (Empirical Foundationalism):
(i) If valid knowing occurs in me, then (epistemically accessible) reality exists, but the distinctive features of the latter are IN NO WAY PREFIGURED by the distinctive features of the former;
(ii) that assertion is based upon EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE and thus is EMPIRICALLY PROBABLE; and
(iii) the first two assertions constitute the general form of the fundamental determinative member of the integral set of basic philosophical stances. (Fs) (notabene)
238a The (empirical) stand that a philosopher in our first group takes on the question of reality's recurrent characteristics will of course reflect that philosopher's judgment about which type of empirical study is the most basic. Thus Thomas Hobbes, for example, giving pride of place to the natural sciences and especially physics, concludes that reality is radically self-absent, fundamentally lacking in consciousness, essentially non-subjective, a view often labelled "metaphysical materialism" or "metaphysical naturalism" (Hobbes, 1651: "The First Part"). Charles Hartshorne, on the other hand, generalizing his reading of the human sciences and especially a version of introspective psychology, concludes that reality is characteristically self-present, fundamentally self-possessed, essentially subjective, a view often labelled "metaphysical idealism" or "pan-psychism" (Hartshorne, 1962: 3-27, 161-233, 245-62). (Fs)

238b Over against this first group of philosophers (with its various sub-groups), our three remaining groups all maintain a different stand on the basic epistemological-metaphysical issue. They jointly profess that certain constant traits of reality necessarily are anticipated, projected in advance, prefigured in some way, by the constant traits of one's valid knowing, whatever the latter are; that one must accept that assertion because any effort to argue the opposite invariably involves one in some kind of contradiction; and thus that one's philosophically most fundamental claim must methodologically precede one's basic epistemological-metaphysical stand. We may call this tripartite contention "pre-empirical foundationalism" and express it thus:

A. 3a (Pre-Empirical Foundationalism):

(i) If valid knowing occurs in me, then (epistemically accessible) reality exists, and the distinctive features of the latter are PREFIGURED by the distinctive features of the former;
(ii) that assertion is based upon PRE-EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE of some sort and thus is INCONTROVERTIBLE; and
(iii) therefore no stance on the basic epistemological-metaphysical issue can constitute the general form of the fundamental determinative member of the integral set of basic philosophical stances. (Fs) (notabene)