Autor: Feser, Edward

Buch: Scholastic Metaphysics

Titel: Scholastic Metaphysics

Stichwort: Szientismus 3; schwache Argumente für d. S. (Rosenberg, ) Beispiel: Metalldetektor; Verteidiger d. S.: oft Fehlschluss: non sequitur

Kurzinhalt: Now if scientism faces such grave difficulties, why are so many intelligent people drawn to it? ... if a certain method affords us a high degree of predictive and technological power, what that shows is that the method is useful for dealing with those ...

Textausschnitt: 0.2.3 The explanatory limits of science

18b If there are limits to what science can describe, there are also limits to what science can explain. This brings us to the third problem I have claimed faces scientism — the fact that the “laws of nature” in terms of which science explains phenomena cannot in principle provide an ultimate explanation of reality. (Fs)

18c To see the problem, consider physicist Lawrence Krauss’s recent book A Universe from Nothing (2012). Krauss initially gives his readers the impression that he is going to give a complete explanation, in purely scientific terms, of why anything exists at all rather than nothing. The bulk of the book is devoted to exploring how the energy present in otherwise empty space, together with the laws of physics, might have given rise to the universe as it exists today. This is at first treated as if it were highly relevant to the question of how the universe might have come from nothing, until Krauss acknowledges toward the end of the book that energy, space, and the laws of physics don’t really count as “nothing” after all. Then it is proposed that the laws of physics alone might do the trick, though these too, as Krauss implicitly allows, don’t really count as “nothing” either. Krauss’s final proposal is that “there may be no fundamental theory at all” but just layer upon layer of laws of physics, which we can probe until we get bored (p. 177). (Fs)

19a Now the problem here is not only that this is a bait and switch -- though it is that, since an endless regress of laws is hardly “nothing,” and vaguely speculating on the basis of no evidence whatsoever that there may be such a regress hardly counts as a serious explanation. The deeper problem is that Krauss not only does not deliver on his promise but that he could not have done so. For any appeal to laws of nature (or a series of “layers” of such laws) simply raises questions about what a law of nature is in the first place, how it has any efficacy, and where it (or the series of “layers”) comes from. And these are questions which the scientific mode of explanation, which presupposes such laws, cannot in principle answer. (Fs) (notabene)

19b The status of laws of nature is a topic we will have reason to consider at some length later on in this book, but for the moment we can merely note that none of the standard approaches gives any aid or comfort to scientism. We might hold, for example, that to speak of the “laws of nature” that govern some material thing or system is simply a shorthand way of describing the manner in which that thing or system will operate given its nature or essence. This, as we will see, is the Scholastic approach to understanding physical laws. But on this view the “laws of nature” presuppose the existence and operations of the physical things that follow the laws. And in that case the laws cannot possibly explain the existence or operations of the material things themselves. In particular, and contrary to writers like Krauss, since the ultimate laws of nature presuppose the existence of the physical universe, they cannot intelligibly be appealed to as a way of explaining the existence of the universe. (Fs)

19c A second view of what “laws of nature” are and how they operate is the one endorsed by early modern thinkers like Descartes and Newton, who sought to overthrow the Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy that dominated the Middle Ages. On their view, the notion of a “law of nature” is irreducibly theological, a shorthand for the idea that God has set the world up so as to behave in the regular way described by the laws. On this view it is really God's action that strictly does the explaining and neither material things nor the laws they follow really explain anything. But for obvious reasons, this too is not a view that gives any help to scientism, which is as hostile to theological explanations as it is to traditional metaphysics in general. (Fs) (notabene)

20a A third possibility is to hold that “laws of nature” are really nothing more than a description or summary of the regular patterns we happen to find in the natural world. They don’t tell us anything about the natures of material things, and they don’t reflect the will of God. To say that it is a law of nature that A is followed by B is on this view simply to say that A’s tend to be followed by B’s in a regular way, and that’s that. But on this view, laws tell us only that such-and-such a regularity exists, and not why it exists. That is to say, on this view a law of nature (or at least the ultimate laws of nature) don’t explain a regularity, but merely re-describe it in a different jargon. Needless to say, then, this sort of view hardly supports the claim that science can provide an ultimate explanation of the world. (Fs) (notabene)

20b A further possibility would be to interpret “laws of nature” as abstract objects, something comparable to Plato’s Forms, existing in a realm beyond the material world, and where physical things somehow “participate in” the laws in something like the way Plato thought that every tree participates in the Form of Tree or every triangle participates in the Form of Triangle. Here too an appeal to laws of nature doesn’t really provide an ultimate explanation of anything. For given this view we would still need to know how it comes to be that there is a physical world that “participates in” the laws in the first place, why it participates in these laws rather than others, and so on. And that requires an appeal to something other than the laws. (Fs)

20c Again, we will have reason to consider this issue in greater depth later on, but the point to emphasize for the moment is that once again we have questions which of their nature cannot be answered by science but only by philosophy, because they deal precisely with what any possible scientific explanation must take for granted. Nor will it do to suggest that ultimate explanation is not to be had anyway, so that science cannot be faulted for failing to provide it. For one thing, this is itself a philosophical claim rather than a scientific one. For another, the claim is false, as we will see later in this book when discussing the principle of sufficient reason. (Fs)