Autor: Manent, Pierre

Buch: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Titel: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Stichwort: Hobbes 3; Souverän: Legitimation; Gleichheit d. Menschen im Naturzustand (Mord) -> Schaffung d. Staates; Zivilgesellschaft (Ort gleicher Rechte) - Reräsentant - Staat (Garant d. Rechte) -> Dilemma

Kurzinhalt: If men are equal in the state of nature because the weakest can always kill the strongest, there is no reason why one man rather than the other commands. If obedience cannot be based on nature ... it can have its source only in convention.

Textausschnitt: 25c This briefly, is how Hobbes deduces the necessity of absolutism, if men want to live in peace. One remark immediately comes to mind: it is better not to let oneself be overly impressed by this sovereign's "majesty." What is actually the foundation of his absolute sovereignty? The right of the individual. And what is the source of this right? The humble necessity for self-preservation, for escaping death. Men must no longer be guided by goods or by the good, but by the right that is born from the necessity of fleeing evil. In the moral and political language developed by Hobbes, and which is still ours today, the right replaces the good. The intensity of moral approval that the ancients gave to the good, the moderns, following Hobbes, gave to the right, the right of the individual. This is the language and "value" of liberalism. (Fs) (notabene)

26a What does it mean to transfer one's unlimited natural right to the sovereign? It means recognizing as mine all actions, whatever they may be, taken by the sovereign. I am the author of all the actions taken by my sovereign; he is my representative. And the unity of the body politic consists of this: all members of the body have the same representative, the sovereign. (Fs) (notabene)

26b After individual rights, there is another founding category of liberal thought: representation. What is the origin of the necessity of representation for the constitution of the body politic? In the state of nature, there is no power, or rather the powers of each person are about equal because men are equal. How does Hobbes establish this important point? By using an argument that can be taken as a joke: in the state of nature, the weakest can always kill the strongest. Is this a weak argument? On the contrary, it is an extremely strong one. If the fundamental human experience is that of evil in the state of nature, if what is most natural is that state of nature, then what is most important in human relations is revealed in this situation. And there is no doubt that in this situation the vulnerability of one person can hardly be very different from the vulnerability of every other person. "You may be more beautiful, more intelligent, more courageous than I, so be it, but I can kill you, by force or by ruse: that is what counts between us." (Fs)

26c If men are essentially equal, if their equal powers are neutralized, then political power that binds the body politic is not natural. If it is not natural, then it is artificial: it has to be fabricated. But an artifact is made entirely by the artisan. In the "finished product," there is—other than the raw material, in this case human nature—only the intention and determination of the artisan, the artificer.1 (By this term, which signifies "artisan," Hobbes designates man in his capacity as creator of the body politic.) Political power incorporates and represents the intention and determination of artisans, who are men in the state of nature desiring peace. Absolute power is only the instrument of the powerless. The ostentatious amplifications of power in the Hobbesian doctrine must not mask a radical weakening of its substance. What is substantial is the equality of the powerless. (Fs) (notabene)

26d What we have here is the matrix of the distinction between civil society and the state. Civil society is the locus of equal rights, and the state is the instrument of this civil society that ensures order and peace. At the same time, the paradox of the Hobbesian doctrine—that the state arises from the civil society over which it exercises absolute power—reflects the fundamental difficulty of the distinction, and of the idea of representation inseparable from it. If civil society is what is natural, and if the state is only its instrument, why is the state detached from society in such a definite way? Why does civil society not simply take it over again, bringing an end to this "alienation"? Conversely, if the body politic exists only through the Representative, then the Representative is more than a mere representative; he gives consistency to civil society and is the source of social existence. The distinction between civil society and the state, and their union through the idea of representation, sets off a natural oscillation between two extreme possibilities: the "withering away" of the state on the one hand, the absorption of civil society by the state on the other. It is a distinction that calls out for negation, a negation that can benefit only one of the two terms.2 (Fs)

27a The relationship between individuals and the sovereign can be formulated in another fashion. If men are equal in the state of nature because the weakest can always kill the strongest, there is no reason why one man rather than the other commands. If obedience cannot be based on nature, but if it is necessary for civil peace, it can have its source only in convention. It can be legitimate only when founded on the consent of the one who obeys. More generally, according to Hobbes, every obligation necessarily has its source in an action taken by the individual who obeys. If, in the state of nature, everyone does as he pleases—that is, what he deems essential for his self-preservation—in the civil state he also does as he pleases by obeying the sovereign. The individual has consented in principle to what the sovereign orders him to do, since he is the Author of his Representative's actions. I have just used the phrase, "does as he pleases by obeying the sovereign." In a sense it explains very well what Hobbes describes: the subject can neither accuse the sovereign nor put him to death, because that would be tantamount to accusing himself or to committing suicide. There is a basic identity between the subject and the sovereign. Still, such an expression is misleading. Hobbes excludes any transfer of will, any representation of one will by another: will belongs to the individual. Certainly, the subject recognizes all the sovereign's actions as his own, but that does not at all signify that the subject recognizes his own will in the sovereign's will. (Fs) (notabene)