Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ

Titel: The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ

Stichwort: Person (Elemente d. Definition); das Subsistente, Subsistenz - das Eine: nähere Bestimmung d. Seienden: ungeteilt in sich getrennt von jedem anderen;

Kurzinhalt:

Textausschnitt: 4 The Subsistent

13 The One - the Subsistent (eü)

46/1 13 That which is being in the stricter sense is also one in the stricter, that is the transcendental, sense. The reason for this is that 'one' adds nothing but negations to being, and therefore the whole perfection of unity necessarily has its foundation in the perfection of being. (33; Fs)

That 'one' adds nothing to being except negations is clear from the definition of 'one.' For what is one is undivided in itself and divided from everything else; but 'undivided in itself merely denies internal division, and 'divided from everything else' merely denies identification with or admixture of anything else. (33; Fs)

That the definition of 'one' is more fully verified in being in the stricter sense than in being in a broader sense is clear from a simple comparison.

47/1 Beings in the stricter sense are not only conceived and affirmed according to the principles of identity and non-contradiction, but in their ontological reality they are also undivided in themselves and divided from everything else. For minerals, plants, animals, human beings, and angels exist apart from one another and all have their own proper existence. (33; Fs)

48/1 On the other hand, beings taken in a broader sense are so conceived and affirmed according to the principles of identity and contradiction that in their ontological reality they are not completely divided from one another; and this is not something that just happens to them, but follows from their very nature. (33; Fs)

For accidents of their very nature inhere in a substance, and for that reason are not simply divided from everything else. The intrinsic principles of being by their very nature come together to form one being in the strict sense, and so are simply divided neither from each other nor from the whole they constitute. Things that are possible are nothing apart from the potency of the agent or that of matter, and hence they are not really distinct from that potency. Finally, 'beings of reason' are nothing outside the mind, and so they cannot be really separated from the mind. (33; Fs)