Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Relationen; innere - äußere Relation; Einwände - Antworten; innere R.: kein Schluss möglich auf äußere R.

Kurzinhalt: But a real internal relation is not enough. For an external relation is more determinate than an internal relation, and this greater determination demands some greater reality, or otherwise there is no truth-correspondence. Our reply is ...

Textausschnitt: Objections
711a

1 Unless an additional reality intrinsic to the subject is admitted, there are no such things as real relations; but the consequence is false, and therefore the antecedent is false. (Fs)
To this we reply that this objection would hold only if one denies that there are real internal relations. (Fs)

2 But a real internal relation is not enough. For an external relation is more determinate than an internal relation, and this greater determination demands some greater reality, or otherwise there is no truth-correspondence. (Fs)

Our reply is that it demands a greater reality extrinsic to the subject but not a greater reality intrinsic to the subject. (Fs)

3 But it does demand a greater reality intrinsic to the subject. For what is truly predicated of anything is intrinsic to that thing. But an external relation is truly predicated of the subject; therefore, the reality of an external relation is intrinsic to the subject. (Fs)

We admit that an absolute predicate indicates a reality intrinsic to the subject. An external relative predicate, however, indicates a reality that is simply the reality of an internal relation, not a reality added to an internal relation. (Fs)

711b
4 But the reality of an internal relation does not suffice. For an internal relation has a respect to any of its terms according to some general reason, whereas an external relation has a respect to this term according to a specific reason; therefore, there are two respects which, as respects, are really and truly distinct from each other. (Fs)

We agree that these two respects are distinct conceptually as respects, and we also agree that they are two in extramental reality by reason of the reality that is intrinsic to the subject and the reality that is extrinsic to the subject; but we deny that they are two through the reality intrinsic to the subject. (Fs)

5 But an extrinsic reality cannot make two real respects out of one. (Fs)

We agree that an extrinsic reality cannot constitute an additional reality intrinsic to the subject, but we deny that an extrinsic reality cannot constitute an objective determination of any respect. (Fs)

711c
6 Perhaps there are external relations that lack internal relations which they determine. (Fs)

713a That in reality there are lacking the internal relations that external relations determine, we deny. But in our minds there is lacking that complete understanding of reality that would enable us in each individual case to assign with certitude and without any fear of error the internal relation that grounds an external relation. (Fs) (notabene)

713b It is most important to note, therefore, that the mere understanding of words and the observation of individual contingent facts are sufficient in order to know an external relation. On the other hand, knowledge of a real internal relation requires an understanding of the things themselves. For this reason all our examples of internal relations are taken from the sciences, and that knowledge of an internal relation is not had until those sciences are sufficiently developed as to be able to furnish an object for reflection and analytical investigation. (Fs)

713c But although all real internal relations cannot be assigned until all things are completely understood, we should not doubt that all things are completely intelligible simply because we do not understand them all. At any rate, it seems sufficient for our present purposes to have proven that there are real internal relations in accidents and in finite substances, in souls and in the metaphysical principles of beings, in things that are caused and quantified, and in natural, living, and intellectual beings. (Fs)