Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Relationen; innere - äußere Relation; Argumente: eine äußere Relation fügt keine neue Wirklichkeit zu einer inneren hinzu

Kurzinhalt: Furthermore, the opinion affirming an additional reality leads to very serious difficulties... according to the opinion affirming an additional reality intrinsic to the subject, when any quantified being changes, all other quantified beings in the ...

Textausschnitt: Arguments

705b
1 In multiplying real beings, truth-correspondence must be preserved. (Fs)

But the opinion denying an additional reality preserves the truth-correspondence, whereas the opinion affirming an additional reality denies it. (Fs)

Therefore, the negative opinion is to be accepted and the affirmative rejected. (Fs)

As to the major premise: being is known only through what is true. (Fs)

As to the minor premise: as is clear from the fourth preliminary clarification, there is no truth-correspondence in external relatives apart from two realities, of which one is intrinsic to the subject and the other extrinsic to the subject. (Fs)

Now the negative opinion has no truth-correspondence apart from these two realities, one that is intrinsic to the subject, namely, an internal relation, and the other extrinsic to the subject, namely, the term. (Fs)
But the opinion affirming an additional reality intrinsic to the subject has its truth-correspondence through this additional reality alone. (Fs)

We substantiate the minor as follows. In truth, A is not twice B except through the reality of A and the reality of B. In the negative opinion, A is twice B solely through the reality of A and the reality of B; whereas in the affirmative opinion, A is twice B through an additional reality intrinsic to A. (Fs)

705c
2 Again, no opinion is admissible that so fails to distinguish clearly between an absolute and a relative that it tends rather to confuse the two. (Fs)

But such is the affirmative opinion. Therefore it is not admissible. (Fs)

As to the minor premise: as has been explained in the third preliminary clarification, absolutes express a reality intrinsic to a subject, but external relatives express not only a reality intrinsic to a subject but also another reality extrinsic to it. (Fs)

Now, one who because of an external relation as external opts for a new reality intrinsic to a subject surely so fails to distinguish between absolutes and external relatives as rather to confuse them; but the affirmative opinion opts for a new reality intrinsic to a subject because of an external relation as external. Therefore, the affirmative opinion cannot be admitted. (Fs)

705d
3 Furthermore, the opinion affirming an additional reality leads to very serious difficulties. (Fs)
707a Each and every quantified being is really related to all other quantified beings in the entire universe by relations that are real, external, and specific. (Fs)
Likewise, all other quantified beings are related to each and every quantified being by relations that are real, external, and specific. (Fs)

For this reason, according to the opinion affirming an additional reality intrinsic to the subject, when any quantified being changes, all other quantified beings in the entire universe would also necessarily change. But no natural cause can be found for all these changes, which necessarily and instantaneously would occur in accordance with extremely exact numerical laws. Therefore, this opinion is inadmissible. (Fs)