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Autor: Ormerod, Neil

Buch: Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Titel: Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Stichwort: Leben nach dem Tod: Platon (neuplatonisch) - Aristoteles; Thomas: Seele transzendiert die materiellen Bedingungen (potentielles Wissen um alles), Trennung von Seele und Leib: "unnatürlicher" Zustand

Kurzinhalt: Death becomes liberation. On this conception of human existence resurrection of the body makes no sense... In a way the position of Aristotle is much closer to that of the Old Testament than writers who draw a sharp distinction between biblical ...

Textausschnitt: THE PLATONIC CONCEPTION OF SOUL

176b The Platonic (or at least Neoplatonic versions of it) conception of the soul is essentially dualistic.1 The person is constituted by a union of two distinct substances: a spiritual substance (soul) and a material substance (body). The immateriality of the soul means that it enjoys a natural immortality, and the soul is the essential reality of the person. Personal immortality, life after death, is an immediate consequence of the spiritual nature of the soul. This position generally denigrates the body as imprisoning the soul, which is released from its bondage to matter in death. Death becomes liberation. On this conception of human existence resurrection of the body makes no sense. Nonetheless Neoplatonism has had an enormous impact on Christianity through the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine, and others. The monastic theology of the Middle Ages was largely Neoplatonic in character and lived with the tension between the inherent dualism of the position and Christian beliefs in the goodness of creation and the resurrection of the dead. It is fair to say that many Christians still adopt this dualistic position in an unreflective and uncritical manner. Although they may accept resurrection of the body, they would find it difficult to fit into their worldview. (Fs)

THE ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF SOUL

177a For Aristotle, on the other hand, the soul is the form or intelligibility of a living thing, so all living things have a soul; what distinguishes the human soul from others is that it is a rational soul. It can understand and reason and so is spiritual in nature. We have explored this spiritual aspect in chapter 2, where we spoke of it in terms of the human search for meaning, truth, and value. However, the soul always remains the form of a living thing and so requires a body for its proper operation. This is particularly evident in the dependence of the intellect, our ability to understand, on the imagination (phantasm), or the senses. There can be no understanding and possibly no memory without phantasm. Given the close union between body and soul, Aristotle was in fact pessimistic about the possibility of survival of the soul after death. For Aristotle, matter individuates us, so without matter we just have general "form." Some Arab commentators on Aristotle, the Averroists, concluded that there was a single human soul, with which we merged at death. (Fs)

177b In a way the position of Aristotle is much closer to that of the Old Testament than writers who draw a sharp distinction between biblical and philosophical conceptions might assume. For Aristotle, the purpose of the soul is to inform a living body. If it is not doing so, it is not performing its natural function. Death threatens the existence of the soul because the soul no longer serves any purpose. The possibility of life after death, of personal immortality, simply cannot be taken for granted from Aristotle's account. Indeed, when Aquinas began to deploy Aristotelian philosophy in his writings he was accused of denying the immortality of the soul, which led to his condemnation by some church authorities.2

178a Aquinas responded to these criticisms by arguing that, though the soul of a human being is dependent on the operation of the senses, still it has its own operation, which cannot be reduced to those senses. The operation of understanding transcends material conditions, since potentially we can understand anything. This operation is "spiritual," that is, not material, and so the human soul is spiritual in nature. Moreover, when I understand something, it is clear that others do not necessarily understand it, so the understanding is mine. My soul is not the same as anyone else's. Aquinas deduces from this that my soul can in fact survive death and that this soul is an essential constituent of my personal existence. Still, for Aquinas I am not my soul;3 my personal identity is that of the union of my body and soul. (Fs) (notabene)

Given the intimate unity of body and soul, that the soul is immortal and the form of a living human being, Aquinas's position almost demands a resurrection as the only proper form of life after death. A soul separated from the body is in an "unnatural" state, and no such unnatural state can be permanent. Perfect human happiness and justice demand the reuniting of body and soul in a resurrection. Despite the naturalness of the resurrection, however, it is something achieved not by nature but by the power of God.4 (Fs)

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