Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Vitaler Akt - Seele, Bewegung; Olivi, Scotus, Thomas (das Objekt verursacht einen Akt in der Seele), intellectus agens, possibilis, species; Wille - Selbstbewegung (S. th., De Malo); Natur

Kurzinhalt: There is no doubt that St Thomas held Aristotle's opinion. His teaching is that the object produces not only the prior disposition or species in the sense but also the very act of sensing.

Textausschnitt: 8 Vital Act

547b According to Aristotle, whatever is moved is moved by something else. According to the Platonic philosophers, however, the soul is generally defined as that which moves itself. (Fs)

Hence medieval Augustinian theologians, after they had been forced to admit the distinction between a soul and its potencies, taught that at least these potencies of the soul moved themselves. For just as a soul would not be alive if it did not move itself, so the acts of a soul would not be vital if they were not produced by those very potencies of the soul. (Fs) (notabene)

547c Peter John Olivi, O.F.M., was a most vigorous proponent of this doctrine. See his Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, vol. 2, Quaestiones 49-71, ed. Bernardus Jansen, s.i. (Ad Claras Aquas [Quaracchi]: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924) q. 58 c, pp. 409-14; ibid. ob. 13 and ad 13m, pp. 400-403, 437-61; ob. 14 and ad 14m, pp. 403-408, 461-515. (Fs)

547d Gonzalvus Hispanus, D.F.M. (Quaestiones disputatae et Quodlibet, ed. cura Leonis Amoros, O.F.M. [Ad Claras Aquas, Florentiae: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1935] q. 3, pp. 27-49) mitigated Peter's opinion in this way, that the object would be not a mere condition of a vital act but would produce in a potency a certain disposition whereby that potency could perform a vital act. (Fs)

The Aristotelian side was upheld by Godfrey of Fontaines (in an exaggerated way), by Thomas Sutton, and by Nicholas Trivet. (Fs)

547e Scotus steered a middle course in maintaining that both the object and the potency were co-causes which came together to produce a vital act. (Fs)

549a There is no doubt that St Thomas held Aristotle's opinion. His teaching is that the object produces not only the prior disposition or species in the sense but also the very act of sensing. (Fs)

[The following passages express this doctrine.]

Super IV Sententiarum, d. 50, q. 1, a. 4 sol.: 'sense knowledge is completed in this, that the sense is moved by a sensible thing.'
Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 57, ¶8, §1333: 'Sensitive soul, therefore, does not function in sensing as mover and agent, but as that by which the receiver of an influence receives it.'
Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 76, ¶15, §1574: '[B]ut if the operation consists in receiving an influence, there is available to it a passive principle, as is evident for sensitive principles in animals.'
In II De anima, lect. 10, §350: 'sensing consists in being moved and receiving an influence.'
In II De anima, lect. 13, §393: 'sensing consists in a certain reception of an influence and undergoing change.'
Summa theologiae, 1, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1m: 'for a sense to be affected is the very sensing of the sense.'
Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 5 c: 'sensing is completed by the action of the sensible thing on the sense.'
Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m: '... two operations. One consisting in alteration alone, and in this way the operation of a sense potency is achieved in this, that it is changed by the sensible thing.'
Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9, ad 2m: 'knowledge in an external sense is constituted by this alone, that the sense is changed by the sensible thing.'

549b Furthermore, it is well known that the possible intellect is a passive potency and that to understand is a certain being-affected. However, since many are not convinced of this, it may help to add a few more detailed passages:

De veritate, q. 22, a. 5, ad 8m: '... the form received in something does not move the thing that receives it; but just as to have that form is itself to have been moved; but the thing is moved by an external agent; just as a body which is heated by fire is not moved by the heat it receives but by the fire. So too intellect is not moved by the species it has already received, nor by the truth which is the result of that species; but by some external thing which leaves an impression on the intellect, as the agent intellect, or phantasm, or something else of that nature.' (Fs) (notabene)

Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 26, a. 2 c: 'A natural agent produces two effects in the receiver. The first effect gives it a form, and the second effect gives it the movement that follows upon the form.' Therefore, if we may suppose a parity here, the agent intellect and the phantasm not only imprint the intelligible species (which is the form received in the possible intellect), but also produce the movement that follows upon that form (this movement is the act of understanding). But if there is no parity with a natural agent, it remains that the operation (the act of understanding) is more perfect than the form (the species) and therefore it cannot have in the species a proportionate mover. (Fs) (notabene)

551a
Super IV Sententiarum, d. 49, q. 3, a. 2 sol.: 'What is ultimate and most perfect in anything is its operation; wherefore every form inherent in a thing is to its operation somewhat as potency is to act; on this account form is called first act (for example, knowledge); and operation (for example, to consider) is called second act, as is evident in the second book of the De anima' (see lect. n, §§359-72). (Fs)

De potentia, q. 5, a. 5, ad 14m: '... that objection is based on second act, which is an operation remaining in the one operating, which is the end of the one operating, and consequently more excellent than the form of the one operating.' See also Super I Sententiarum, d. 35, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4m; De malo, q. 1, a. 5 c; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 2; q. 49, a. 3, ad im; 3, q. 9, a. 1 c; a. 4 c. Also, see the places cited in §2 above: 'The Two Proportions between Act and Potency.'

552a What St Thomas taught concerning the will is consistent with this doctrine. In his writings up to the first part of the Summa theologiae, there seems to be no mention about the will moving itself, but the Aristotelian principle holds, that 'the desirable when apprehended moves the appetite,' and freedom is based upon the fact that 'concerning contingent beings, reason is open to opposites' (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 83, a. 1 a). Indeed, he writes that 'the free will is the cause of its movement because a human being through his or her free will moves himself or herself to act' (ibid, ad 3m). He also writes that the will of itself is moved (ibid. q. 105, a. 4, ad 2m and 3m). But the expression 'the will moves itself does not appear. See Theological Studies 3 (1942) 533-37 [Grace and Freedom 94-98]. (Fs)

552b Yet in De malo, q. 6, and in Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. 3 c, it is explicitly stated that the will moves itself, not, however, because in the will there is an active and a passive element as there is in the intellect (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 83, a. 4, ad 3m), but because the will when in act concerning the end brings itself from potency to act concerning the means. But the act concerning the end comes from an external source (ibid. 1-2, q. 9, a. 4), which source is God alone (ibid. a. 6), who moves human beings both to good in general and, through grace, to a particular good (ibid. a. 6, ad 3m). Clearly, then, the will is moved and does not move in the act whereby it wills the end; and this point is explicitly made concerning operative grace (ibid. q. in, a. 2 c). (Fs)

552c All this presents no difficulty so long as one does not impose upon St Thomas a doctrine that he never taught, that of vital act, to wit, that the potencies of living beings move themselves to all their acts. He had no need of such a notion to explain quite satisfactorily both life in general (Summa theologiae, I, q. 18, a. 2) and life in God (ibid. a. 3), who certainly is an unmoved mover. (Fs)

553a These apparent difficulties have two sources, the first of which is forgetting what nature means. According to Aristotle, the motor or mover per se is something extrinsic; for it is defined as the principle of motion or change in another as other. On the other hand, nature is defined as the principle of motion or rest in that being in which there is motion. And since all potencies are principles of motion in that being in which there is motion, it is clear that they all possess the formality of nature and that from an intrinsic principle and naturally they receive both forms and second acts. (Fs)

553b Another source of the apparent difficulties is Aquinas's frequent use of a non-Aristotelian terminology. The intellect when informed by a species or a habit is an active potency, a principle of action, a formal principle of action, and also a principle of an effect. All these belong to a terminology that seems to be derived from Avicenna and in no way contradict the rest of Thomist doctrine. As Aquinas expressly teaches, the procession of an operation perfects the operator and therefore it cannot be admitted that such a procession in God is real (De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m). In fact, although in his earlier works using this terminology he spoke of the form of heaviness in heavy objects as being an active principle and an active potency, nevertheless he denied that this principle of movement was a motor. Relevant texts are listed in Theological Studies 8:3 (1947) 418 [Verbum 121, note 88]. (Fs)