Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Gott - Person: univok, äquivok, analog; geschaffene Personen: unterschieden durch Substanz; göttliche Personen: unterschieden durch Relation; intellektuelle Natur; Intellekt - Bezug auf Sein: als Potenz - als Akt; Subsistenz

Kurzinhalt: QUESTION 15 -- Is 'person' predicated analogously of God and of creatures?; Intellect is defined by its relation to being; for intellect is that which can become all things ...

Textausschnitt: QUESTION 15 -- Is 'person' predicated analogously of God and of creatures?

337a Univocal predicates affirm the same thing about several individuals; equivocal predicates affirm different things; analogous predicates state the same thing, which, however, is verified differently in different individuals. (Fs)

337b Now, 'person' is not predicated equivocally of God and of creatures, for in each case the same definition is verified, namely, a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. (Fs)
Nor is 'person' predicated univocally of God and of creatures. For in creatures there are as many persons as there are substances, whereas in God there are three persons but only one substance. (Fs)

It remains, therefore, that 'person' is predicated analogously of God and of creatures, since in each case the same definition is verified, and yet it has truth in different ways in God and in creatures. (Fs) (notabene)

337c This analogy is based proximately on the fact that divine persons and created persons are distinguished differently. Created persons are distinguished on the basis of substance - angels on the basis of specific substantial distinction, humans on the basis of numerical substantial distinction. The divine persons, however, are distinguished not on the basis of substance, since they are consubstantial, but on the basis of relations, as stated by the Council of Florence: 'everything is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition' (DB 703, DS 1330, ND 325). (Fs) (notabene)

337d If you wish to inquire further why there exists this difference between divine and created persons, you must refer to differences in intellectual nature. Intellect is defined by its relation to being; for intellect is that which can become all things, and 'all' is not restricted to any genus. But there is one intellect that is related as act to all being, and this is the infinite intellect of God, which comprehends in itself both itself and everything else. Another kind of intellect is related as potency to all being, and this in two ways: first, as one that is always in act with respect to its own intelligibles, and this is the angelic intellect; and second, as one that proceeds from potency to act, and this is the human intellect.1 (Fs) (notabene)

337e Further, certain differences concerning subsistence follow upon these differences in intellectual nature. (Fs)

If an intellectual nature is the act of all being, it is infinite, a se (from itself), and absolutely simple. Because it is absolutely simple, there is no real distinction between that which is and that by which it is. And because there is no such distinction, all that is in it is that which is and is subsistent, as we have said above concerning the divine relations as subsistents. (Fs)

339a If, however, the intellectual nature is finite, there is an opposition between the finitude of its own reality and the infinity of its adequate object, total being. Because there is this opposition, Aquinas proves that in every finite intellectual nature these four are really distinct: substance, act of existence, operational potency, and operation itself.2 On account of these real distinctions between a subsistent itself and the intrinsic causes by which it is constituted, it is manifest that not everything that is in a finite intellectual nature is also that which is, or subsistent. (Fs) (notabene)

339b Finally, as a consequence of these differences regarding subsistence, there are differences regarding distinction. (Fs)

Since in the infinite intellectual nature there is no distinction between that which is and that by which it is, it follows that the real divine relations are subsistent; and further, since these real relations are mutually opposed, it follows that they are really distinct from one another. Hence, in the infinite intellectual nature a distinct subsistent is a subsistent relation. (Fs) (notabene)

339c In a finite intellectual nature, on the other hand, that which is and that by which it is are different, and therefore it is obvious that the subsistent itself and the intrinsic causes by which it is constituted are not the same, and that none of these causes is subsistent. Therefore, although a finite subsistent in an intellectual nature both is distinct and has relations, nevertheless, just as the subsistent itself has intrinsic causes, so also do the distinction of the subsistent and the relations of the subsistent have intrinsic causes, and none of these intrinsic causes subsists. Hence, in a finite intellectual nature it is impossible for a distinction to result from a subsistent relation; for in such a nature the subsistent, the distinct, and the related are from causes that do not subsist; and since every relation is an order of the subject to another, the distinct subsistent, which is the subject, is prior to its order to another. (Fs) (notabene)