Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Trinität, Gott: keine vierte Person; Erweiterung d. Definition: "distinkt" (Subsistentes in einer intellektuellen Natur) aufgrund der Folgerungen aus d. Trinität

Kurzinhalt: QUESTION 11 - In what sense is God a person?; Therefore, one who knows God but does not know the Trinity knows 'a subsistent in an intellectual nature' and does not know that 'a subsistent in an intellectual nature' does not satisfy the definition ...

Textausschnitt: QUESTION 11 - In what sense is God a person?

329d According to the Fourth Lateran Council (DB 432, DS 804, ND 318), God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit; and therefore, since the Father and the Son and the Spirit are three persons, God also is three persons.1

331a According to the same Council, 'In God there is only a trinity, not a quaternity.' Therefore God is not some fourth person besides the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. The reason is that a person is a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature; and since the Father is God, God is not really distinct from the Father, and so in the case of the other persons. And for the same reason God the Spirator is two persons, namely, the Father and the Son; nor is the Spirator another person besides the Father and the Son. (Fs) (notabene)

331b But it may be further asked in what sense God is a person, since God can be known without the Most Holy Trinity being known. The first thing to say is that this question is not about God but about a concept and, indeed, about a concept as imperfect. Then there is added the fact that a more imperfect concept and a less imperfect concept are two concepts compared to each other not on the basis of the real identity of the object but on the basis of an intentional change in the subject. On these grounds, it must be said that the word 'God' is understood to mean 'having a divine nature,' which means 'subsisting in a divine nature,' which in turn means 'subsisting in an intellectual nature.' Furthermore, according to the supposition the Trinity is unknown, and it is therefore likewise unknown that a person is 'a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature,' since the word 'distinct' was not added to the definition until after the Trinity was known. Therefore, one who knows God but does not know the Trinity knows 'a subsistent in an intellectual nature' and does not know that 'a subsistent in an intellectual nature' does not satisfy the definition of person. In other words, one who is ignorant of both the Trinity and the definition of person thinks of God as a person. (Fs)