Autor: Vertin, Michael -- Mehrere Autoren: Lonergan Workshop, Volume 8

Buch: Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Titel: Byrne, Patrick H., Insight and the Retrieval of Nature

Stichwort: Aristoteles: Natur als Ganzes; Sphären des Himmels; Nous

Kurzinhalt: Insofar as one is seeking the ultimate natural principle of Nature, this is the outermost sphere; but insofar as one is seeking the ultimate principle of Nature without qualification, it is Nous itself, the Unmoved Mover.

Textausschnitt: 1.4 Nature as a Whole

16b The theory of the causes supplies one part of the account of the regularity of natural motions: because things have natures (forms and matters), no natural thing "acts on, or is acted on by any other chance thing" (188a32-341). But even this neither suffices to explain the degree of regularity found in the whole of Nature, nor accounts in any way for the phenomena of chance. Because efficient causes form series, the issue becomes more complicated. In the biological examples, parents are principal efficient movers of the whole sequence of movements; but prey "set off" predatory behaviors, and mature members of the opposite sex "set off mating behaviors. Hence, prey and mates stand as the proximate efficient movers of their corresponding sets of motions. Similarly, climatic changes are among the proximate efficient causes of changes in plant growth cycles. Thus to the theory of causes, Aristotle added a scheme of the sequences and constellations of movers and moveds. Very briefly, the scheme looks like this:

16c The outermost sphere of the cosmos moves in a perfectly circular fashion, according to that sphere's potency to receive motion. It is not moved by being "pushed," but rather by its "aspiration" for the perfection of the form of Nous itself, the Unmoved Mover. The outermost sphere, in turn, moves the next inward sphere, according to its natural potency, and so on inward. If all the potencies were of exactly the same nature, they would all turn in exactly the same, synchronous fashion. However, because the arrangements and types of potencies admit of irregularity, the movements of the spheres become more and more complex as one moves inward toward the earth. The movements of the planets admit of a regularity, but one far more complex (i.e., including retrograde motions) than that of the stars. The movements of the innermost sphere, the "atmo-sphere"-namely, the seasons and weather patterns in general-have a certain regularity, but also a great deal of irregularity as well: it isn't always wintery on December 22, nor does it rain exactly 20 inches every year, but only "for the most part." (Fs)

17a Finally, terrestrial motions of animate and inanimate things have regularities, but these are radically contingent upon where and when their movers act upon them. Changes in the atmosphere (climate) move, but do not completely govern, cycles of plant growth. Plants move the sensations and desires of herbivores in complex ways; herbivores similarly move carnivores; and the whole of the sensible world moves the senses, thoughts, and practical actions of humans. Because of the multi-potentialities of their natures, each can be naturally changed in a variety of different fashions, depending upon which mover happens to be in a position to move one or another at a given time. In turn, once changed, the moved's capacity to effect a change in yet another is altered in a complex fashion, and so on. (Fs)

17b Although this schema may evoke in the modern reader images of sequences of "efficient" causes, it must be borne in mind that Aristotle thought of it in the complete generality of sequences and combinations of all four causes, especially the "final" cause. (Fs)

17c The repetitions built into this scheme, Aristotle thought, would provide adequate room for account of the regularities of Nature apparent to epagoge. On the other hand, this scheme also provides an account of the objective reality of chance, without turning chance into a "cause." Chance turns out to be the intervention of a second mover in the midst of a pattern of change initiated by an earlier mover.2 The intervention, and the consequent changes ensuing from it are perfectly "natural" and causal; but there is no causal relationship between the movement initiated by the earlier mover and the place and time at which the second mover intervenes. From the view point of the earlier natural causal sequence, the second movement is merely "chance." (Fs)

18a This scheme also makes clear the ambiguity of the question of the principle of any natural change: from one point of view it is the matter and form of the moved; from another, it is the form of the mover; from yet another, it is the matter and final form which a whole pattern of change produces. Again, the scientific search for first principles of Nature must lead from what is most evident (first) to our senses (the changes as described) to what is relatively prior (the "nature" of the changed), then beyond to what is still more prior (the hierarchy of spheres) and finally to what is ultimately prior. "Ultimate priority" itself admits of a distinction. Insofar as one is seeking the ultimate natural principle of Nature, this is the outermost sphere; but insofar as one is seeking the ultimate principle of Nature without qualification, it is Nous itself, the Unmoved Mover. This accounts for the fact that the later books of the Physics (Books N and Q) relate the First Mover to the earlier discussion. But the "chain" of causes tracing back to the first mover is not a simple one, for Aristotle (like scientists of the late 19th and 20th centuries, but unlike those of the 17th and 18th centuries) acknowledged the objective reality of chance in the cosmos (B. 4-6). For Aristotle, then, real scientific investigation brings one to a profound recognition of the intricacy of natural interconnections, and especially the connection of Nature with its ultimate non-natural principle, namely the form of Nous in its highest actuality, the Unmoved Mover. (Fs)