Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Natur - Gott; Definition (3 Bedeutungen, Aristoteles); Name Gottes; Intellekt - Unendlichkeit; Existenz des Unendlichen; Natur als inneres Prinzip der Tätigkeit

Kurzinhalt: ... since we use the term 'nature' in two ways, and in the first way the term is not applicable to God while in the second it refers to that in God which in this life we cannot know.

Textausschnitt: The Nature of God

193b Since generation results in a likeness in nature, we have to consider the question, What is the nature of God? But this question seems somehow insoluble, since we use the term 'nature' in two ways, and in the first way the term is not applicable to God while in the second it refers to that in God which in this life we cannot know. (Fs)

193c Thus, according to Aristotle, nature is defined as the principle of motion and rest in that in which it exists first and per se and not as an accident.1 But God is absolutely simple; otherwise God would not be the first principle of all things. So there cannot be in God a real distinction between a principle of motion or of operation and the motion or operation itself. In this sense, therefore, nature cannot be posited in God. (Fs)
193d However, if 'nature' is taken in the sense of essence, then nature can be acknowledged in God, but we do not know it. For in this life we do not know what God is. Although the name 'God' is assigned to signify the divine nature, nevertheless the name itself is not derived from a known nature; so it seems that the name 'the One who is' is the most proper name of God, because this name is taken from God's act of existence and leaves unmentioned every determining form in order to signify an infinite ocean of substance.2 (Fs)

195a On the other hand, according to St Thomas God's act of understanding is God's substance,3 God's nature is God's very act of understanding,4 and intellectual creatures are in the image of God because they possess a specific likeness.5 (Fs) (notabene)

195b It seems, therefore, that one ought to respond that, if 'nature' is taken in the sense of essence, then in this life we do not know what God is because we do not understand God through a species proportionate to the divine essence.6 Still, this in no way prevents us from knowing God analogically in this life or from ordering what we know analogically in such a way that some element of what we know analogically is first after the manner of a nature or essence. In this sense, the nature of God is God's act of understanding, upon which follow God's infinity and aseity and simplicity, and whatever else there is in God but unknown to us. (Fs)

195c Indeed, infinity so belongs to the very notion of intellect that an intellect in act with respect to its total object is infinite. For since the intellect is such as to become all things, and since 'all things' admits no specific or generic limitation, the object of intellect is the totality of being.7 It follows that intellect tends toward its object in such a way that it does not rest until it beholds God in God's essence;8 that every created intellect is a passive potency;9 that every created act of understanding is distinct from the substance of the creature, distinct from its act of existence, and distinct from its operative potency;10 and that an intellect in act with respect to its total object is infinite being.11 (Fs)

195d Moreover, infinite being cannot be from another; so intellect in act with respect to its total object is from itself. (Fs) (notabene)

197a Again, the infinite excludes potency; for hat is in potency to a further perfection falls short of infinity by that very fact. (Fs)

197b Again, the intellect in act is the intelligible in act; and intellect differs from the intelligible only to the extent that both are in potency.12 But the infinite excludes potency. Therefore, understanding that is in act with respect to its total object is not distinct from the intellect that understands. Furthermore, the infinite itself as knowable or intelligible is not distinct from the act of understanding by which it is understood.13 Finally, the infinite act of understanding is true with respect to itself, not because of a likeness, as if the knowing and the known were two, but because of the absence of unlikeness.14 (Fs) (notabene)

1.Kommentar (28.05.08): Das "both" in "that both are in potency" ist irreführend. Cf. Thomas, F4_014: 'Das Sinnenfällige im Wahrgenommensein ist der Sinn im Wahrnehmen, und das Verstehbare im Verstandensein ist der Verstand im Verstehen' (Aristoteles). Denn dadurch fühlen oder erkennen wir etwas im Vollzug, wenn unser Verstand oder Sinn durch ein sinnenfälliges oder geistiges Bild im Vollzug geformt wird. Und nur insoweit unterscheiden sich Sinn und Verstand vom Sinnenfälligen und Verstehbaren, als [oder solange] sie beides nur der Möglichkeit nach sind. (9; Fs)

197c Again, the natural act of existence of the infinite is not different from its intentional act of existence. For the natural act of existence of some being is the act of existence by which it is; and its intentional act of existence is the medium by which it is known. But in the case of the infinite, the act of understanding by which the infinite is known is the same as the intelligible which is known. Therefore, the natural act of existence of the infinite is the same as its intentional act of existence.15 (Fs) (notabene)

197d Again, the infinite is absolutely simple. For a single act of understanding is simple; and an infinite act of understanding is a single act; and this single act is identical with all that the infinite knows concerning the infinite. (Fs)

197e Again, although we conceive the infinite only analogically inasmuch as we ascend from our finite act of understanding, nevertheless the infinite act of understanding comprehends itself perfectly. And it does not comprehend itself as different from its very act of understanding but as identical in every way. And so if the nature of God is conceived as an intellect in act with respect to its total object, then the infinity of God, the aseity of God, and the simplicity of God all follow, as does everything else in God that remains unknown to us. (Fs)

197f If, however, 'nature' is taken not in the sense of essence from which all else follows, but in the sense of the intrinsic principle of operation, we can conclude again that the divine nature is intellectual. For although absolutely no real distinction can be posited in God according to our natural knowledge of God, still, as we come to know God through faith and theology, we discover real personal distinctions in God that are constituted through relations of origin. Now, 'the mode of origin is not the same in all things; rather, the mode of origin of each thing is in accord with what befits its own nature: animate things being produced in one way, inanimate things in another; animals in one way and plants in another. It is evident, therefore, that the distinction of divine persons is in accord with what befits the divine nature.'16 But 'the uncreated Trinity is distinguished on the basis of the procession of the Word from the Speaker and of Love from both.'17 And so, since the origins in God are according to the emanations of intellectual consciousness, we must conclude that the divine nature is intellectual. (Fs)