Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Wissenschaft: Erkenntnis aus Gründen; Ziel, zwei Wege: Analyse, Resolution ... (Dogmatik, dogmatische Theologie) - Synthese, Komposition ... (systematische Th.); Theologen: Missverständnis der differenzierten Einheit

Kurzinhalt: It follows that the dogmatic way can be conceived as similar to the analytic way ... for like reasons the systematic part of theology can be conceived as similar to the way of synthesis ...

Textausschnitt: 59d How these two movements are related to each other can be clarified from the very notion of science. Science is the certain knowledge of things through their causes; but before things are known through their causes, the causes have to be discovered; and as long as the causes have not yet been discovered we rely on the ordinary prescientific knowledge by which we apprehend things and describe them even before knowing their causes. (Fs)

61a So the first movement toward acquiring science begins from an ordinary prescientific description of things and ends in the knowledge of their causes. This first movement has been called:

(1) analysis, because it starts from what is apprehended in a confused sort of way and moves to well-defined causes or reasons,
(2) the way of resolution, because it resolves things into their causes,
(3) the way of discovery, because previously unknown causes are discovered,
(4) the way of certitude, because the ordinary prescientific knowledge of things is most obvious to us, and so the arguments we find most certain begin from such knowledge and go on to demonstrate matters that are more remote and more obscure to us, and
(5) the temporal way, because causes are not usually discovered instantaneously, any more than they are discovered by just anyone or without a certain amount of good luck.1 (Fs)

61b The other movement starts from the causes that have been discovered and ends by understanding things in their causes. This movement is called:

(1) synthesis, because fundamental reasons2 are employed both to define things and to deduce their properties,
(2) the way of composition, because causes are employed to produce things or to constitute them,
(3) the way of teaching or of learning, because it begins with concepts that are fundamental and especially simple, so that by adding a step at a time it may proceed in an orderly way to the understanding of an entire science,
(4) the way of probability, partly because it often attains no more than probability, but also because people frequently have no clear discernment of just where or when they have reached certitude, and
(5) the way of logical simultaneity, because, once the principles have been clearly laid down, all the rest takes comparatively little time; it can be accomplished in a few short deductions and applications. (Fs)

61c For examples of the two ways, compare the history of a science like physics or chemistry with the textbooks from which these sciences are taught. History reveals that these sciences worked out their various demonstrations starting from the most obvious sensible data. But when one goes to a textbook, one finds at the beginning of the book, in chemistry, only the periodic table of elements from which three hundred thousand compounds are derived, or, in physics, Newton's laws, Riemannian geometry, or those remarkable quantum operators. The reason for this difference is, of course, that inquiring, investigating, and demonstrating begin with what is obvious, while teaching begins from those concepts that can be understood without understanding other elements. (Fs)

63a Now since theology is analogously a science, its dogmatic part is not completely different from the way of analysis, nor is its systematic part completely different from the way of synthesis. Just as in the natural order we begin from ordinary prescientific knowledge, so also in theology we begin from what God has revealed in particular historical circumstances. Just as in the natural order we proceed to the discovery of causes, so theology states universally in the same meaning the same truth that was once biblically3 revealed. Just as in the natural order the discovery of causes leads to the knowledge of things through the causes, so in theology once the divine mysteries have been declared or defined universally, they can be imperfectly and obscurely but still most fruitfully understood. (Fs)

63b It follows that the dogmatic way can be conceived as similar to the analytic way. It is a way of certitude in that it expresses the same truth with the same meaning as what was revealed by God. Second, it is a way of discovery in that it finds an expression appropriate to the needs of a universal church that is to endure till the end of time. Third, it is a way of analysis in that it moves from historical Hebraic particularity to generally known and well-defined reasons. Fourth, it is a way of resolution in that it discerns the divine mysteries in the multiplicity of what has been revealed, and gives expression to those mysteries. Finally, it is a temporal way because a universal expression of the mysteries is attained only in the course of time. (Fs)

63c In like manner and for like reasons the systematic part of theology can be conceived as similar to the way of synthesis. For it is the way in which teachers teach and students learn, at least if it is true that for something truly to be learned it must be understood and that the only way to reach understanding is to start with that whose understanding does not require the understanding of anything else. It is, moreover, a way of synthesis in that, starting from one principle or another, it lays out all the rest in an orderly fashion. Third, it is a way of composition in that it composes the whole of a divine mystery from a series of aspects and a multiplicity of reasons. Fourth, it is a way of probability because, rather than deducing certainties from what has been revealed, it derives what has been revealed from some prior hypothetical supposition. Finally, it is a way of logical simultaneity in that, once in one's wisdom one discovers the order of the questions, and once in one's understanding one grasps a principle, then the conclusions and the applications follow of their own accord. This derivation of conclusions may be deficient in terms of logical rigor, since it proceeds from a principle that is only imperfectly and obscurely understood; but that does not mean that the process of arriving at conclusions from a systematic principle is the kind of thing that proceeds one step at a time over a long stretch of years, with a certain amount of luck. (Fs)

65a While we have acknowledged in the dogmatic way something of the process of analysis, of resolution, of discovery, of certitude, and of a temporal way, and in the systematic way something of the process of synthesis, of composition, of teaching and learning, of probability, and of logical simultaneity, we cannot ignore the fact that these terms are used analogously. Analysis and synthesis are understood in one way in physics and in another way in chemistry; they are understood in one way in the natural sciences, in another way in the human sciences, and in another way in theological disciplines. The way we understand the nature of material things is different from the way we understand the words of Plato; and when we understand Plato, we next judge whether what Plato held is true. But we believe that the word of God is true even before we investigate what it teaches. Therefore the dogmatic way has its own mode of being a way of analysis, of resolution, of discovery, of certitude, and a temporal way, and the systematic way has likewise its own mode of being a way of synthesis, of composition, of teaching or learning, of probability, and of logical simultaneity. (Fs)

65b How intimately these two ways are linked must be particularly stressed because there never seem to be lacking those whose diminished wisdom is ready and eager to take a part for the whole and to pass it on as such to others. Analysis and synthesis, resolution and composition, discovery and teaching, certitude and the understanding of what is certain, lengthy investigation and a brief compendium of results - these constitute a single whole. Those who choose but one part and neglect the other not only lose the whole but also spoil even the part that they have chosen. Those who neglect the dogmatic part in order to cultivate the systematic more profoundly are in fact neglecting what they are seeking to understand. Soon pseudo-problems emerge and pseudo-systems start to sprout, systems that dispute ever so subtly about everything while overlooking the understanding of the mysteries. But those who neglect the systematic part in order to hold faithfully and exactly to the dogmatic so resolve the one divine revelation into many different mysteries that no move can be made back from this multiplicity to unity; from what God has revealed for all to understand, they devise in the course of time a technical expression of that revelation, but they do not grasp how these technical matters are to be taught and learned. They know with certainty many technical matters, but choose to overlook the understanding of what they are certain of. They rummage through the past collecting and accumulating technically established information concerning the councils, papal documents, the Fathers, the theologians, but they avoid the task of assembling a wisely ordered, intelligible compendium of all these matters. And after all this, they stand amazed that devout people reject dogmatic theology and take refuge in some form of biblicism that is itself hardly secure. (Fs)