Autor: Stebbins, J. Michael

Buch: The Divine Initiative

Titel: The Divine Initiative

Stichwort: Definition: Objekt - id quod operationi opponitur; intellectus possibilis - agens; Beispiele

Kurzinhalt: efficient cause = 'agent objects'; effects = 'terminal objects'; distinction between agent intellect and possible intellect, intelligere - dicere; Object and Attainment

Textausschnitt: eg: Beispiele für die Beziehung Subjekt - Objekt -> Objekt als Wirkursache der Tätigkeit oder als bewirkt. S. unten 20/4

19/4 We come now to the notion of object, which is defined as 'that which is opposed to an operation' [id quod operationi opponitur] (DES:39). Lonergan goes on to amplify the sense of this definition: 'an object is either an effect produced by an operation, or an efficient cause which produces an operation'; conversely, 'an operation is either an efficient cause which produces an object or an effect produced by an object.' If the potency is passive, the object produces the operation; if the potency is active, the operation produces the object. In order to avoid confusion on this score, Lonergan sometimes refers to 'agent objects' (that is, efficient causes) and 'terminal objects' (that is, effects). Thus, the explanatory relation of operation to object is one of efficient causality, although in any given instance one has to ascertain which is cause and which is effect. (98; Fs)

20/4 Near the end of the third Verbum article, Lonergan provides a helpful illustration of objects and of the other terms and relations that I have presented in the last few pages: (99; Fs)
The distinction between agent intellect and possible intellect is a distinction between an efficient [that is, active] potency that produces and a natural [that is, passive] potency that receives [...] The distinction between intelligere and dicere is a distinction between the two meanings of action, operation: intelligere is action in the sense of act; dicere is action in the sense of operating an effect. The distinction between agent object and terminal object is to be applied twice. On the level of intellectual apprehension the agent object is the quidditas rei materialis, [...] known in and through a phantasm illuminated by agent intellect; this agent object is the objectum proprium intellectus humani [the proper object of the human intellect]; it is the object of insight. Corresponding to this agent object there is the terminal object of the inner word; this is the concept [...] Again, on the level of judgment the agent object is the objective evidence provided by sense and/or empirical consciousness, ordered conceptually and logically in a reductio ad principia, and moving to the critical act of understanding. Corresponding to this agent object, there is the other terminal object, the inner word of judgment, the verum, in and through which is known the final object, the ens reale. (notabene)