Autor: Stebbins, J. Michael

Buch: The Divine Initiative

Titel: The Divine Initiative

Stichwort: Bewegung - Tätigkeit; Definition: actus perfectus, imperfectus;

Kurzinhalt: First act: 'the act of what is in potency inasmuch as it is in potency'; second act: 'the act of what is in act'; distinction between action (praxis) distinct from its end and action coincident with its end

Textausschnitt: 9/4 In the first two theses of De ente supernaturali, Lonergan uses 'operation' and 'second act' synonymously, but in the third he introduces a distinction. Second acts are of two kinds. The first he calls actus imperfecti (act of the imperfect or incomplete), and it is defined as 'the act of what is in potency inasmuch as it is in potency' {actus exsistentis in potentia prout huiusmodi); it is equivalent to movement (motus) The other kind of second act, actus perfecti (act of the perfect or complete), is 'the act of what is in act' (actus exsistentis in actu); this is operation in the strict sense of the word. (96; Fs)

10/4 A more descriptive account of the two kinds of second act can be found in Aristotle's Metaphysics, which Lonergan paraphrases as follows: (96; Fs)

There is a distinction between action (praxis) distinct from its end and action coincident with its end. One cannot at once be walking a given distance and have walked it, be being cured and have been cured, be learning something and have learned it. But at once one is seeing and has seen, one is understanding and has understood, one is alive and has been alive, one is happy and has been happy. In the former instances there is a difference between action and end, and we have either what is not properly action or, at best, incomplete action - such are movements. In the latter instances action and end are coincident - such are operations.
11/4 Thus, for example, reasoning is a movement but understanding is an operation; weighing the evidence is a movement but grasping the sufficiency of the evidence is an operation. Again from the Ethics: (96; Fs)