Autor: Stebbins, J. Michael

Buch: The Divine Initiative

Titel: The Divine Initiative

Stichwort: Gnade: Naturalia - Gratuita

Kurzinhalt: in this context nature has to do with what one receives at birth, and grace with what one receives in addition, as a free gift

Textausschnitt: 20/3 A definitive resolution of the foregoing problem would have required the application of the theorem of the supernatural, but there was not as yet a sufficient grasp of the meaning of 'nature' to make the discovery of the theorem a possibility. Although the concept of nature underwent dramatic development during the twelfth century, it did not begin to receive its comprehensive formulation within the framework of Aristotelian metaphysics until the first part of the thirteenth century, with the result that, prior to the work of Philip the Chancellor, attempts to define grace in contradistinction to nature tended to go awry. In some authors, one finds natura and what pertains to natura (the naturalia) associated with terms such as origo (origin) and datum (given), while gratia and what pertains to gratia (the gratuita) are associated with supererogatoria (what is paid over and above), superadditum (what is added over and above), and donum (gift), among others. In other words, in this context nature has to do with what one receives at birth, and grace with what one receives in addition, as a free gift. Magister Martinus affords an example of this line of thought: (73; Fs)

25/3 From this standpoint, then, there are no virtues in the unjustified, for they do not possess charity. Because virtues are the principles of good acts, consistency would seem to demand the further conclusion that the unjustified, being bereft of virtues, are incapable of any good act. While a few twelfth-century theologians took this extreme view, most chose a different tack: they tended to admit the possibility of acts prior to justification that are good in some sense, but they denied that such acts could be meritorious of eternal life. Still, in the absence of a satisfactory distinction between goodness and merit, the term 'good' was applied to the acts of the unjustified only hesitantly and in a diminished sense. (74; Fs) (notabene)