Autor: Stebbins, J. Michael

Buch: The Divine Initiative

Titel: The Divine Initiative

Stichwort: Unterschied: Gott (Schöpfer) - geschaffenes Sein; Identität v.: Einheit: Sein, Wesen, operative Potenz u. Tätigkeiten

Kurzinhalt: Intelligibilität: keine Ursache für das Sein; distinctions between essence and act of existing, between operative potency and operation

Textausschnitt: 16/2 The relation of essence to existence and of operative potency to operation is that of potency to act. Now a potency cannot actuate itself, for potency in itself is mere possibility. Nor can an act cause itself, for to do so would require that it somehow be an act prior to being an act, which is impossible. The immanent intelligibility of a being, then, does not account for the coming-to-be of either its actual existence or its operations. Instead, the transition from accidental passive potency to second act is always due to some extrinsic principle, which in Aquinas's language is termed the 'efficient cause' or 'agent.' An efficient cause is the answer to questions of the type, 'What caused this being actually to exist?' or 'What caused this operation actually to occur?' This question, by the very fact of its being raised, constitutes a tacit acknowledgment that knowing the essence of a thing does not suffice for a complete grasp of its intelligibility. (41; Fs) (notabene)
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20/2 Beyond the sheer fact of its existence, a number of predications can be made of this absolutely necessary being. First, to be absolutely necessary is to be pure act. Metaphysical analysis attributes contingence to any act that is the realization of a potency, for every such act is conditioned; hence an absolutely necessary efficient cause is an act with no corresponding potency. Second, since the distinctions between ontological components are grounded in the fundamental distinction between act and potency, pure act is absolutely simple. Still, this is not to deny that pure act has an essence, for it has an immanent intelligibility (albeit one that lies beyond the range of human knowing); nor that it has an esse, for it exists; nor that it has operative potencies, for it is capable of acting; nor that it has operations, for it is by actually operating that it is the ultimate efficient cause of proportionate being. In the absolutely necessary being, however, these terms are not distinct but identical: essence, existence, operative potencies, and operations are one and the same reality. Thus, the compositeness that characterizes proportionate being contrasts with the absolute simplicity of pure act. Third, because pure act is absolutely free of the limitations imposed by potency, it is infinite. Within the universe of proportionate being, acts always involve the realization of a single form, which is the specific determination of a particular genus of potency; but pure act is absolute perfection, that is, the realization of an unrestricted intelligibility. Finally, precisely because it lacks potency, which is the ground of all distinction, pure act is unique. If there were two or more pure acts they would have an identical, infinite intelligibility; and since there is no potency in a being that is pure act, there could be no distinction of subjects in which two such acts could be received. Hence a plurality of pure acts is impossible. This last point has an important corollary: because there is only one pure act, everything else that exists or occurs - and not only proportionate being, whose ontological constitution provides the basis for affirming the existence of pure act in the first place - must be composed of potency and act. To be a creature, therefore, is also to be finite and contingent. (42; Fs)
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22/2 The proper meaning of terms that are predicated of God cannot be understood by any creature, for finite intellects are not capable of grasping an infinite intelligibility. Such predications signify negation more than they do positive content: to call the necessary being 'infinite' is to deny that its intelligibility is limited in any way; to call it 'simple' is to deny that it is composite; to call it 'pure act' is to deny that it is conditioned by any potency whatsoever. Such characteristics are truly affirmed of God not because we know God uti in se est but solely because we know God insofar as he is the ultimate cause of proportionate being. None the less, to affirm them is to assign a theoretical meaning, albeit primarily a negative one, to the notion of God's transcendence. (43; Fs)