Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: A Third Collection

Titel: A Third Collection

Stichwort: Elemente des menschlichen Wissens; parallel: Sinnesdaten und Bewusstsein

Kurzinhalt: George Santayana (Skepticism and Animal Faith); that the data of sense and the data of consciousness are parallel; Similarly the data of consciousness are not an instance of self-knowledge but ...

Textausschnitt: 25/13 But a parallel liberation can be bestowed on human studies. One way to this goal is the quantification of statements about human beings. An alternative way is to have philosophy do for human studies what mathematics does for natural science. I may presume that you are familiar with the former procedure, and so I may be content to indicate what the latter entails. In 1923 George Santayana published a book entitled Skepticism and Animal Faith. The pair were considered opposites with skepticism the lot of an elite and animal faith the lot of the masses. But neither animal faith nor skepticism is compatible with the general dynamics of method: animal faith asks no questions, and skepticism answers none. For me the real alternatives are animal faith and critical philosophy. On the one hand, animal faith is the fate of everyone who learns in childhood to speak his mother tongue, may entertain no doubt about all he believes he knows, but never has found out for himself and in himself just what are the events that come together to constitute human knowledge. On the other hand, in the measure that one finds out for oneself and in oneself just what these events are, one not merely is a critical philosopher but also one successful enough to be liberated, especially from animal faith in some unknowable thing-in-itself. (209f; Fs)
26/13 I may be asked just what events do come together to constitute human knowing. Very schematically, there are three: first, the givenness of the data, which is the objective of research; secondly, a cumulative series of insights into the data, which respond to the question for intelligence and yield a hypothesis; thirdly, a probable judgment on the adequacy of the insights. (210; Fs) (notabene)
27/13 At this point there may return the notion that human knowing is not a threefold compound but a single simple act at least in the field of our own consciousness. Certainly many have thought of consciousness as an inward look, an instance of what they may name introspection, and it is by such a look (they might claim) that we are aware of the givenness of the data, the occurrence of insights, the sufficiency of the evidence. But to my mind this is just a fresh avatar of the intuitions attributed to animal faith. For I believe that the data of sense and the data of consciousness are parallel. The data of sense do not constitute human knowledge but only a first step to such knowledge. Similarly the data of consciousness are not an instance of self-knowledge but only a first step towards attaining such knowledge. All our intentional acts also are conscious acts. But to advert to them as conscious, we have to deemphasize the intentional and heighten the conscious side of the act. Only when that is achieved can we proceed to gain insight into the relations that unify our conscious acts and then to pass judgment on the validity of the relations. (210f; Fs) (notabene)