Understanding the Church's teaching about what could be meant and what is said by the doctrine of transubstantiation is no easy task. Not done quickly. If you or I were to go down into a public space and if we were to say that we happen to believe in the real presence of Christ within the Eucharist, we would probably be understood. If there are other believers present (and others who have lost their faith) and if they have all received some kind of catechetical formation about what occurs at the celebration of Mass, they would understand, as Catholics, what would be meant by the real presence of Christ within the Eucharist. However, if, instead, any of us were to say that we believe in transubstantiation, we would probably not be understood by anyone (whether Catholic or not). In the same way too, we would probably not be understood if we were to say publicly that we happen to believe in the consubstantiality of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. Like transubstantiation, consubstantiality exists as a technical term. Its use invokes a technical form of expression and the use of all technical terms points to technical meanings of one kind or another that are being signified and which are supposed to be communicated through the use of technical terms. In these instances (as examples), the teaching office of the Catholic Church sometimes prescribes teachings which are to be held and believed although they are not immediately or commonly understood by most persons who are to be regarded either as believers or as potential believers. The phraseology of these words does not belong to the run of our ordinary speech and yet, despite this difference (whether defect, fault, or omission), we are all asked as Catholics to subscribe to the truth of teachings whose meanings are not often or usually obvious to us.¹ Hence, to explain the meaning and the truth of this teaching about transubstantiation presents a challenge that is not easily met if the object is an explanation that all persons should be able to understand and then acknowledge and accept through the rendering or the reception of an assent which, to some extent, would be conditioned by the

¹For some evidence that testifies to the truth of this observation, please look at the Catechism of the Council of Trent and attend to what it says about the necessity of belief in transubstantiation. Cf. Pope Pius V, Catechism of the Council of Trent, trans. J. Donovan (Baltimore: Lucas Brothers, 1829), p. 163. On the one hand, all Catholics are expected to adhere to the truth of this teaching and the same Catechism at the same time attempts to explain why transubstantiation should be fully believed: why this teaching possesses the reasonableness which, in fact, it has. Where, within the natural order of things, we speak about “transformations,” when we must think about the kind of change which occurs at Mass in the context of the Church's Eucharist, we should speak about the kind of change which occurs here as transubstantiation. That which does not exist at a natural level exists in another way at a supernatural level. However, as the Catechism proceeds to warn us (its readers):

...according to the admonition so frequently repeated by the Holy Fathers, the faithful are to be admonished against the danger of gratifying a prurient curiosity, by searching into the manner in which this change is effected. It mocks the powers of conception, nor can we find any example of it in natural transmutations, nor even in the wide range of creation. The change itself is the object not of our comprehension, but of our humble faith; and the manner of that change forbids the temerity of a too curious inquiry.
extent or the depth of our understanding and knowledge to the degree that, individually, we experience varying degrees of understanding which, in turn, lead judgments and the knowledge which is acquired through the kinds of judgments that we can each make.

As an initial point of departure thus, if we were to attend to secondary sources of meaning or if we were to try to use secondary sources of meaning in order to understand primary sources of meaning, the dictionary kind of meaning that we would find in commonly available reference texts will usually not add to the extent of our prior understanding (its use will often add to our sense or our lack of understanding) because an examination of words and meanings that are commonly given and suggested often points to other words and meanings which would also exist as technical expressions of meaning. For example, in various sources, it is said that “consubstantial” means “of the same substance, nature, or essence,” or “one in being,” or “of the same kind of stuff as.” But then, what do these words mean? If we attend to “transubstantial,” we find words which say as follows: “changed or capable of being changed from one substance to another.” Hence, to understand “transubstantial,” we must move toward a possible understanding of “substance” (identifying what this could be) and then, from there, move toward an understanding of “change” (a specific type of change). In some way, we all sense that not every kind of change should necessarily exist as a substantial kind of change. Many other changes can also possibly exist and it is no easy task to distinguish between them and to know about that which would exist specifically as a substantial kind of change. In moving from one technical expression of meaning to another technical expression of meaning, a method of study is used which functions as a species of closed circle and, when we attend to something which exists as a closed circle, we might not know about how we can break into this circle in a way which can indicate where, why, or how the truth of things exists. We want to grow in our understanding of things but, hopefully, in an understanding which can somehow change us from within.

Hence, in this case (as in others), if we are to understand the meaning and the truth of a technical specification of meaning, some other kind of approach is needed (one which would be more useful for the sake of the kind of understanding that we would like to have). To understand transubstantiation, we would look for a point of departure which would not attend to formulations of meaning as these exist in technical specifications of meaning (specifications of meaning which would exist as theoretical specifications of meaning). As we recall a teaching or a directive that comes to us initially from the kind of analysis which we can find in Aristotle: we best move from that which we already know or that which we immediately know and then, from there, we can gradually move toward that we have yet to


3For an extended, apt example about how we can speak about a meaning for transubstantiation which attends to other technical expressions of meaning and how these technical expressions of meaning all relate to each other in a way which points to a species of closed circle, please see Ludwig Ott's *Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma*, ed. James Canon Bastible, trans. Patrick Lynch (Rockford, Illinois: Tan Books and Publishers, Inc., 1974), pp. 380-381. In this context, transubstantiation is referred to as a “concept” and to understand it, as a concept, we should attend to other concepts although the manner of expression (the existence or the wording of concepts) does not indicate how these concepts have emerged from a context that is conditioned by prior acts of understanding which should be referred to and which, to some degree, we should experience by ourselves if we are to understand concepts in a manner which transcends the mere meanings of words if we are to move towards apprehensions of meaning that know about the meaning and truth of things that words and concepts are meant to signify and represent.
grasp, understand, and know. From the known, we move toward the known. From a clearer understanding of things that we already understand and know, we best move toward an understanding of things that are related or which are joined in some way to that which we already understand and know.

Let us begin then with a few preliminary observations. As noted, transubstantiation is prescribed as an official teaching of the Catholic Church. It is to be held by all persons who claim both the Catholic name and the Catholic allegiance: submission to the authority of the Bishop of Rome as the Supreme Pontiff, as Christ's Vicar on earth, and as the “teacher of all Christians.” In the context of promulgated teaching documents, transubstantiation was first mentioned by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 in a credal context: in one of its decrees (in its first canon) and its prescription was later confirmed by the promulgations of the Council of Trent in 1551 (although in a manner which imparted a greater emphasis to the status of the Church's teaching as this exists with respect to the meaning and the truth of transubstantiation). The Fourth Lateran Council had spoken, as belonging to the Church's creed de fide, that bread and wine is "transubstantiated" into the body and blood of Christ. In the terms of its language: “His body and blood [Christ's body and blood] are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the forms of bread and wine, the bread and wine having been transubstantiated by God's power, into his body and blood [literally: transsubstantiatatis pane in corpus, et vino in sanguinem].” In 1274, the Second Council of Lyons

5Citing the relevant text as this comes to us in 1445 from the union Council of Florence:

We likewise define that the holy Apostolic See, and the Roman Pontiff, hold the primacy throughout the entire world; and that the Roman Pontiff himself is the successor of blessed Peter, the chief of the Apostles, and the true vicar of Christ, and that he is the head of the entire Church, and the father and teacher of all Christians; and that full power was given to him in blessed Peter by our Lord Jesus Christ, to feed, rule, and govern the universal Church.

6Cf. Engelbert Gutwenger, *Sacramentum Mundi An Encyclopedia of Theology*, 1970 ed., s. v. “Transubstantiation.” Citing the relevant text and its immediate context as this is given to us in Canon 1 of the Fourth Lateran Council:

There is one Universal Church of the faithful, outside of which there is absolutely no salvation. In which there is the same priest and sacrifice, Jesus Christ, whose body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the forms of bread and wine; the bread being changed (transsubstantiatio) by divine power into the body, and the wine into the blood, so that to realize the mystery of unity we may receive of Him what He has received of us. And this sacrament no one can effect except the priest who has been duly ordained in accordance with the keys of the Church, which Jesus Christ Himself gave to the Apostles and their successors.
reiterated this teaching when it said, in the context of a new credal statement (the “Profession of Faith of Michael Palaeologus”), that “the...Roman Church...holds and teaches that in this sacrament [of the Eucharist] the bread is truly transubstantiated into the body of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the wine into his blood.” However, in 1551 the Council of Trent added to this teaching or it accented this teaching in its own way by noting that, in transubstantiation, “by the consecration of bread and wine, there takes place that wonderful and singular conversion [converso mirabilis et singularis] of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his Blood – the species only of the bread and wine remaining – which conversion indeed the Catholic Church most aptly calls Transubstantiation [italics mine].” Hence: when we speak about a change that occurs at Mass when bread and wine are allegedly changed into Christ’s body and

---


7Second General Council of Lyons, Profession of Faith of Michael Palaeologus, Second Part, #28, as cited by The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, ed. Jacques Dupuis, 6th ed. (Bangalore: Theological Publications in India, 1996), p. 20. Please note in this context that, in Greek, transubstantiation is referred to in terms which speak about meta-ousiosis: a “change of being.” While John A. Hardon, in his Modern Catholic Dictionary, 1980 ed., s. v. “transubstantiation,” claims that, before the 6th Century, Greek theologians (the Eastern Church Fathers) had spoken about meta-ousiosis (a “change of being”), because I have not found other sources (other authors) who hold to this point of view, I am inclined to accept a majorian point of view which claims that meta-ousiosis was coined within the Greek language in the wake of the Second General Council of Lyons when, in the 13th Century, Greek theologians needed a Greek term to express what is said and what is meant when transubstantiation is spoken about within a context which refers to the use of Latin as the medium of language and communication. Cf. Ott, p. 379.

8Cf. Ott, pp. 379-380. Citing the relevant text and its immediate context as this is given in the Decree Concerning the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, chapter 4, as issued by the Council of Trent, 13th Session, October 11, 1551:

And because that Christ, our Redeemer, declared that which He offered under the species of bread to be truly His own body, therefore has it ever been a firm belief in the Church of God, and this holy Synod doth now declare it anew, that, by the consecration of the bread and of the wine, a conversion is made of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of His blood; which conversion is, by the holy Catholic Church, suitably and properly called Transubstantiation [italics mine].

---

See https://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct13.html (accessed March 24, 2015). The same decree in its second canon also pronounces an anathema on anyone who should deny the Church's teaching about the truth or the validity of the Church's teaching about what occurs in transubstantiation:

If any one saith, that, in the sacred and holy sacrament of the Eucharist, the substance of the bread and wine remains conjointly with the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and denieth that wonderful and singular conversion of the whole substance of the bread [totius substantiae panis] into the Body, and of the whole
blood, with respect to this change, conversion, or transformation, it is said or it is suggested to us (in some way) that no better teaching is known or no better teaching exists other than that which we mean and understand when we refer to the transubstantiation of eucharistic bread and wine.

After the Council of Trent, in the wake of the Council of Trent, reiterations of this teaching began to proliferate in a number of different contexts. In 1564, in another credal statement, Pope Pius IV reiterated the Church's teaching about transubstantiation: simply noting that, at Mass, "there takes place a change (conversio) of the whole substance of bread into the body and of the whole substance of wine into the blood; and this change the Catholic Church calls transubstantiation." When the *Catechism of the Council of Trent* appeared in September 1566, it directly referred to the Council of Trent and how, in the eucharist, there is an "admirable change...[which] the Catholic Church more appropriately expresses by the word 'transubstantiation'." In a new credal statement that was issued by Pope Benedict XIV in 1743, Trent's teaching about transubstantiation was prescribed for Marionite Christians who wished to be in union with Rome. However, in a change of venue, when pronouncing censures in 1794 against the teaching of the Synod of Pistoia which had convened earlier in 1786, Pope Pius VI noted that this synod had erred in saying nothing about transubstantiation although, as Trent had prescribed, transubstantiation is to be regarded as an "article of faith." In responding to a number of deviations which occurred with respect to the truth of the Church's teaching, in 1887, the Holy Office (during the pontificate of Pope Leo XIII) issued a decree which censured a number of teachings that were derived from the writings of Antonius de Rosmini-Serbati. A false interpretation of transubstantiation is to be rejected.

A growing concern with some interpretations of transubstantiation or, better still, a growing concern with interpretations which seemed to supplant and to replace the Church's teaching about transubstantiation perhaps best explains why, since the middle of the 20th Century, there have been a number of interventions from a number of popes which have sought to defend the truth of the Church's teaching. For example, in 1950, in his encyclical *Humani generis*, Pope Pius XII warned against interpretations which tended to take away from the reality of Christ's Real Presence within the Eucharist (a reality which is best communicated or maintained if we adhere to the Church's teaching about the reality of transubstantiation). As the Pope notes:

> There are some who pretend that the doctrine of transubstantiation, based, as they say, on a philosophical notion of substance which is now out of date, must be corrected in such a way that the presence of Christ in the most holy Eucharist is reduced to some

substance of the wine [*totius substantiae vini*] into the Blood - the species only of the bread and wine remaining - which conversion indeed the Catholic Church most aptly calls Transubstantiation; let him be anathema.

---


10*Catechism of the Council of Trent*, p. 163.


sort of symbolism; the consecrated species would be merely efficacious signs of Christ's spiritual presence and of his intimate union with his faithful members in the mystical Body.\textsuperscript{14}

In the footsteps of Pope Pius XII, in 1965 (on September 3, 1965), Pope Paul VI issued a new encyclical,\textit{Mysterium fidei}, which warned against efforts to develop new interpretations of the kind of change which occurs at Mass where the explanations which are provided tend to degrade or to downplay what the Church has traditionally taught about what is meant by transubstantiation.

It is not allowable [...] to exaggerate the element of sacramental sign as if the symbolism, which all certainly admit in the Eucharist, expressed fully and exhausted the mode of Christ's presence in this sacrament. Nor is it allowable to discuss the mystery of transubstantiation without mentioning what the Council of Trent stated about the marvellous change of the whole substance of bread into the body and of the whole substance of wine into the blood of Christ, speaking rather only of what is called 'transignification' and "transfinalisation."\textsuperscript{15}

On transubstantiation itself, the Pope notes that:

The voice [of the Church], which always echoes the voice of Christ, makes us certain that Christ becomes present in this Sacrament in no other way than by the change of the whole substance of the bread into his body and of the whole substance of the wine into his blood, and this unique and truly wonderful change the Catholic Church rightly and properly calls transubstantiation [italics mine]. As a result of transubstantiation [italics mine], the species of bread and wine undoubtedly take on a new meaning and a new finality, for they no longer remain ordinary bread and ordinary wine, but become the sign of something sacred, the sign of spiritual food. However, the reason why they take on this new significance and this new finality is because they contain a new "reality" which we may justly term ontological. For there no longer lies under those species what was there before, but something quite different; and that, not only because of the faith of the Church, but in objective reality, since after the change of the substance or nature of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, nothing remains of the bread and the wine but the appearances, under which Christ, whole and entire, in his physical "reality" is bodily present, although not in the same way as bodies are present in a given place.\textsuperscript{16}


\textsuperscript{16}Pope Paul VI,\textit{Mysterium fidei}, as cited by O'Connor, p. 264; and as cited by\textit{The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church}, #1580, ed. Jacques Dupuis, p. 603. A few years later, when promulgating a "solemn profession of faith" on June 30, 1968 (officially cited as\textit{Solemn Hac Liturgia} but more popularly known as the "Credo of the People of God"), Pope Paul again reiterated the truth of the Church's teaching, noting the special status which belongs to the Church's teaching about the meaning and significance of transubstantiation:
Similarly, Pope John Paul II in his encyclical letter, *Ecclesia de eucharistia*, issued in 2003 (April 17, 2003) teaches as follows:

The sacramental re-presentation of Christ's sacrifice, crowned by the resurrection, in the Mass involves a most special presence which – in the words of Paul VI – “is called 'real' not as a way of excluding all other types of presence as if they were 'not real', but because it is a presence in the fullest sense: a substantial presence whereby Christ, the God-Man, is wholly and entirely present.” This sets forth once more the perennially valid teaching of the Council of Trent: “the consecration of the bread and wine effects the change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. And the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called this change transubstantiation.” Truly the Eucharist is a *mysterium fidei*, a mystery which surpasses our understanding and can only be received in faith, as is often brought out in the catechesis of the Church Fathers regarding this divine sacrament: “Do not see – Saint Cyril of Jerusalem exhorts – in the bread and wine merely natural elements, because the Lord has expressly said that they are his body and his blood: faith assures you of this, though your senses suggest otherwise.”

...in this sacrament Christ cannot become present otherwise than by the change of the whole substance of bread into his body, and the change of the whole substance of wine into his blood, while only the properties of the bread and wine which our senses perceive remain unchanged. This mysterious change is fittingly and properly named by the Church transubstantiation. Every theological explanation which seeks some understanding of this mystery must, in order to be in accord with Catholic faith, maintain firmly that in the order of reality itself, independently of our mind, the bread and wine have ceased to exist after the Consecration, so that it is the adorable body and blood of the Lord Jesus which from then on are really before us under the sacramental species of bread and wine, as the Lord willed it, in order to give himself to us as food and to bind us together in the unity of his Mystical Body.


*Transubstantiation* means the change of the whole substance of bread into the substance of the Body of Christ and of the whole substance of wine into the substance of his Blood. This change is brought about in the eucharistic prayer through the efficacy of the word of Christ and
However, as we move from official statements of church teaching to peruse dictionary meanings of one kind or another (as these can be commonly found), differences in wording do present themselves to us in a way that points to a number of different perspectives. It is said, for instance, that, from a philosophic perspective, transubstantiation refers to the conversion of one substance into another kind of substance and that, when we move into a Catholic religious perspective, in transubstantiation: at Mass, eucharistic bread and wine are respectively transformed into Jesus's body and blood although, as a qualification, it is noted that “their appearances remain the same.”

In the transition that we should notice here, a philosophic meaning has been taken and it has been adopted, applied, and put to use within a theological dogmatic perspective.

However, when we turn to the history of Catholic theology in the West (as this existed prior to the promulgation of doctrinal affirmations which referred to the value of believing in the truth of transubstantiation), we find a form of theological usage which predates any form of dogmatic usage by almost two centuries.” It is alleged thus that the term was first employed or that it was first coined as a neologism in the 11th Century, approximately in 1079, by Hildebert de Lavardin (d. 1133), the Archbishop of Tours, when, in a sermon whose authorship is suspect, he used this term or he constructed this term in order to speak about the kind of change which occurs when eucharistic bread and wine are turned into Christ's body and blood. In the same year, in 1079, at a Roman synod,

by the action of the Holy Spirit. However, the outward characteristics of bread and wine, that is the “eucharistic species”, remain unaltered.

21 J. Pohle, Catholic Encyclopedia, 1913 ed., s. v. “Eucharist.” However, other sources (other authors) identify Roland Bandinelli (who later became Pope Alexander III in 1159) as, in fact, the first person to speak about transubstantiation. Cf. Ott, p. 379. None dispute the authorship of a theological treatise that was written by him, the so-called De Sententiis Rolandi (“On the Opinions of Roland”), which first appeared circa 1140 and which speaks about transubstantiation although, at that time apparently, no definition or explanation was given about what occurs in transubstantiation or about what is meant by transubstantiation until about 1180 when Alan of Lille published a theological work which has been cited as the Four Books against the Heretics. The length and the details that we find in his proffered explanation point to a point of view that, at a later date, was adopted by Aquinas although with clarifications and modifications in the choice of words which, in turn, points to a greater consistency in the use of technical terms as this expertise was derived, adapted, and developed from the kind of analysis which we can find in the larger corpus of Aristotle's works that was known by Aquinas in the context of his own day and time but which was not known earlier by Alan of Lille within the context of his own day and time in the later decades of the 12th Century. Cf. O'Connor, p. 182, pp. 115-117; Gutwenger, Sacramentum Mundi, s. v. “Transubstantiation.”

These things being said however, it should be noted that other sources allege that, as a noun, transsubstantiatio was first employed by St. Peter Damian (d. 1072). The alleged context was his Expositio Canonis Missae (which was published by Cardinal Angelo Mai in his “Script. Vet. Nova Coll.” VI. 215). Cf. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/hcc4.i.xi.xxv.html (accessed April 9, 2015).
an oath was taken by a Berengarius of Tours, a controversial French deacon who later died in 1088. The wording that we find in this oath refers to the presence of a substantial kind of change. “The bread and wine that are placed on the altar are, through the Mystery of the sacred prayer and the words of Our Redeemer, substantially changed \([\textit{substantialiter converti}]\) into the true and proper and life-giving Flesh and Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ.”22 One kind of substance is converted to become another kind of substance and in moving here from one kind of substance to another kind of substance, we encounter the idea or the intelligibility of that which exists as transubstantiation. The idea, the meaning, or the intelligibility of transubstantiation predates later acts of conceptualization which attempt to speak about the kind of intelligibility which belongs to this kind of change which exists in transubstantiation when, within this context, we signify the kind of change which occurs by what is meant when we speak about the teaching of transubstantiation.23

A theological or a religious understanding of transubstantiation accordingly comes to us as we advert to the theological origins of this new teaching within the history and the development of Catholic theology. This kind of study (this scholarship) obviously points to the different kinds of questions

Allegedly too, however, it is said that, as a verb, \textit{transsubstantiare} was first employed by Stephen, the Bishop of Autun (d. 1139). The alleged context was his \textit{Tractatus de Sacramento Altaris}, c. 14 (citing his words: \textit{panem, quem accepti, in corpus meum transsubstantiavi}), although, as O'Connor notes, p. 182, some scholars question the authenticity of Stephen's authorship. No definitive judgment can be presented thus by us at this point unless an exhaustive search is exhaustively undertaken of all the early known sources which, for us, is not our goal or purpose. However, the gathering and assembly of early references would serve to point to the early development of a new way of speaking and writing which, in time, led to magisterial judgments about the fittingness and the truth of the Church's teaching as this applies to how the change of transubstantiation occurs within the context of the Church's Eucharist.

22O'Connor, p. 179, citing from the “Oath taken by Berengarius.” See also O'Connor, p. 115, where it is noted that transubstantiation was coined as a single word (a technical term) in order to refer that which has been substantially changed (in Latin: \textit{substantialiter converti}).

23With respect to the meaning or the idea of transubstantiation before we can speak about the word which refers to the kind of change which is referenced whenever the word “transubstantiation” is used, it is said that the idea, the meaning, or the intelligibility was first grasped by Abbot Lanfranc of Bec in 1063 when, in \textit{Of the Body and Blood of Our Lord}, he had spoken about the conversions of substance (one to another) and not about the conversion of anything which would exist initially as some kind of accident or attribute. Cf. Aidan Nichols, \textit{The Holy Eucharist: From the New Testament to Pope John Paul II} (Dublin: Veritas Publications, 1991), pp. 63-64. According to Lanfranc:

The material objects on the Lord's Table which God sanctifies through the priest are – by the agency of God's power – indefinably, wondrously, in a way beyond our understanding, converted to the body of Christ in their being. Their outward appearances and certain other qualities remain unchanged, so that those who receive them are not shocked by the naked flesh and blood, and so that believers may receive the greater rewards of faith. What we receive is the very body which was born of the Virgin, and yet it is not. It is, in respect of its being \([\textit{essentia}]\) and the characteristics and power of its true nature; it is not if you look at the outward appearance \((\textit{species})\) of the bread and wine.
which then were being asked by some Catholic theologians and why, for some of them, transubstantiation seemed to present itself as a legitimate answer or as an apt solution for problems which had existed at that time in the relation which exists between understanding and belief. However, if we are to avoid a rather lengthy kind of historical study which would have to attend to the ups and downs of theological controversy and if we are to understand transubstantiation in terms which can refer to how its meaning stands or exists on its own (apart from the influence and existence of pertinent external conditions), then, for a more direct approach, we can do no better than to move into a philosophical species of inquiry.

For the sake of an understanding which yearns or which looks for a greater degree of comprehensiveness, we begin with a line of inquiry that moves through a number of points or steps which should lead us, eventually, to the kind of understanding which, ideally, we would like to have in knowing about the meaning of transubstantiation.

With respect then to the meaning or the signification of transubstantiation, when we attend to the wording of the commonly accepted definitions that we have come down to us through time in the inheritance of our philosophical and theological tradition, two steps or two questions accordingly present themselves to us. First, we attend to the question of substance and we attempt to understand what could be meant by “substance.” Then, secondly, we attend to the question of change and we attempt to understand change as this exists among substances, one kind of substance becoming another kind of substance. The structure of our argument first distinguishes between that which exists as a substance and that which exists for us as a body that we always immediately encounter within the order or the kind of structure which belongs to how, as human beings, we engage in our acts of human cognition. We begin with that which exists for us as a body (it is an object that is sensed) before we move toward that which exists as a substance (it is an object that is not sensed). We begin with that which exists as a body which, more easily, we should understand and know and then, from there, we move toward substance (a notion of substance). Cognitionally, that which exists as a body does not suppose anything which would have to exist as a substance. But, that which exists as a substance would always suppose that which initially exists as a body if, in our study, we are to move from that which exists as a body toward that which exists as a substance. The prior kind of knowing and understanding which we can have about bodies (the nature of bodies) conditions the later kind of knowing and understanding which we can have about the nature of substances or about how substances exist as things or objects that differ from bodies which exist as another kind of thing or as another kind of object.

However, before we attend to how bodies differ from substances or how bodies differ from substances as things, please note that the word “thing” is now often used as a synonym or as a substitute for the traditional term which we have when we speak about that which exists as a “substance.” The language of “substance” betrays origins that come to us from the earlier history of Greek philosophy. In his *Confessions*, 4, 28, St. Augustine had referred to Aristotle's *Ten Categories* which he had read as a young man when a student in Carthage where, in Aristotle's listing of classifications or categories, “substance” heads a list of ten descriptive attributes (or ten descriptive predicates) which are used to speak about anything which can be given to us within the data or the content of our sensible human experience. In the wake of substance or with respect to any given substance, attributes or accidents exist as limitations or specifications of substance: specifications which, in Aristotle, would refer to

---

determinations of quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, time, posture, and habit. However, if we prefer to refer to substances in a way that wants to employ a different kind of language, “thing” has come to be used as an alternative designation. And so, if “thing” is used instead of “substance,” it is hoped that readers would think less about meanings and interpretations that have down to us through the history of philosophy where the object of focus has been “substance” and that which exists as substances (versus the meaning or the species of some other kind of being). However, in the wake of this terminological conceptual change, I am not aware of a terminological or conceptual change which has attempted to produce a neologism that equivalently refers to “transubstantiation.” Admittedly, yes, attempts have been made to produce alternative explanations for what happens at Mass whenever we speak about the kind of transformation which occurs when the rite of consecration is celebrated by a validly ordained priest. Within this context, the kind of change which occurs at Mass can be possibly given an interpretation which differs from the kind of change that is signified whenever we speak about the reality of a transubstantiated change. However, it is another issue (it is a second question) to ask about other possible theories of change which, perhaps, could be relevant and about how, possibly, we can raise questions which would challenge or which could possibly add to the received teaching which we already have and which prefers to speak about the aptness of transubstantiation as the best explanation that can be given for what happens whenever a priest celebrates the Eucharist in a manner which accords with church practice.

Turning now to that which exists as a body and how bodies differ from substances or things (the reality of bodies apart from the reality of substances), a useful point of departure for understanding bodies appears to be a distinction which distinguishes between things as bodies and things as things (or, in other words, in the older more traditional language, things as substances). A thing as a body refers to a thing as it relates to our acts of human sensing and as it is known by us through our acts of human sensing and so, within this context, it follows from this that a thing as it relates to my acts of sensing properly refers to that which exists for us as a body.

In three dimensions that we can perceive, a body exists as a naturally existing individual unit or with a naturally existing unity which refers to a material specification of unity or, in other words, a body that is endowed with a bodily kind of unity.

---


26Please distinguish here between artificially existing objects (which exist as artifacts) and naturally existing objects (which exist as gives within the world of our ordinary experience). Naturally existing objects exist apart from any form of human intervention which would act from without to bring something other into being which before had not existed. Where, in metaphysics (as the science or philosophy of being), we want to understand the constitutive principles of being which would refer to the being of the world or the being of the universe as it exists in itself (apart from the existence or the being of a human world which we have brought into being as a consequence of our human actions), on the other hand, when we refer to things that exist as human inventions or things that exist as human products, if we should want to try and speak about our humanly constructed world in a way that works with metaphysical principles, as a given case requires, we should try to work with analogies. In this context, we adapt metaphysical principles in a manner which would seem to be the most appropriate for us. Analogically speaking, for instance, a car or a house exists as a “constructed thing”; it exists as a “technological thing,” as a “technical being.” Cf. David Fleischacker, as quoted by Ronald Shady in conversation, June 27, 2012. It has potency; it has form; and it has act. Its intelligible
this context, matter and body refer to the same thing. Better put, matter and body imply each other. Matter exists as a body or as several bodies that could be grouped together in a manner which points to the experience or the presence of a larger mass (an amorphous mass). To reiterate here; bodily unity is something which is directly sensed. It is immediately known by us through our varying acts of human sensing and through any descriptive conjugates which would exist as terms that belong to our various acts of human sensing (either our own acts of sensing or the acts of sensing which belong to other human beings as sensing subjects), there being no real distinction between a given act of sense and that which is given to us or that which is sensed by us through a given act of sense. In the experience which we have of our empirical sensation and as we attend to the self-experience which we have of this sensation, we find that a cognitional form of identity is to be found between an act of sensing and that

unity (its *unum per se*) is explained by an intelligently related structure of parts where the relation constructs the unity of a whole, enhancing or adding to the meaning which exists when we refer to the meaning or the intelligibility of any of the constitutive parts. However, this unity is something which is imposed from without through the mediation of some kind of artificial form (cited in Aquinas as a *forma artificialis*). Cf. Bernard Lonergan, *Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism*, ed. Philip J. McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988), p. 72; p. 334. Natural form is contrasted with artificial form although both forms are grasped by us through acts of understanding which are experienced by us as a datum that belongs to our intellectual consciousness.

However, in contrast, the intelligible unity of a naturally existing object is explained by the mediation of a natural form which already exists within a given object that is given to us in some way through the contents of our ordinary experience and which we can only view as a species of imposed, artificial form if we should choose to speak about causal forms as these would exist within God (the transcendent mind and being of God). Apart from the primary causality of God, natural forms are simply given to us within the world (the data) of our sensible experience (apart or prior to how we might respond to the being of this naturally existing world through any questions that we might want to ask about it). Always admittedly however, as we directly experience the world which we find about us and as we ask questions about it, we can always conclude, through our reasoning, that our world has been brought into a condition of being from a prior condition of potency through the activity of a powerful external agent, through a species of subject or a center of activity which would be quite other than ourselves (being other than the agency or the kind of subjectivity which belongs to us as human beings who exist as human subjects).

But, again however, as we can begin initially with a distinction which distinguishes between naturally existing objects and artificially existing objects, we should note *as a precaution* that, in simply distinguishing between naturally existing things and humanly existing things, we should not get into a frame of mind which would not be open to knowing and realizing how we can introduce changes into the physical, chemical, and biological nature of things in ways which can change the nature of these things, adding to the nature or the intelligibility of things in ways which can change the existence of things through cultivations and adaptations of nature that can be introduced into the order of things by the understanding and kinds of decisions which we make as human beings (in our lives as human subjects). Art or *techne* works through nature (the natural order of things) to change the world or the universe within which we are currently living. While some forms can be imposed in a manner which does not change the form or the intelligibility of anything that is being manipulated or worked on or which is being used in some way by us as active human agents, other impositions of form or other
which is sensed by by in a given act of sensing. In a way of speaking which comes to us from Aristotle and Aquinas, sense or sensing in act is to be equated with the sensible in act or that which is sensed in act. No act of sense can exist without its term or object. Neither can exist without the other. When we hear a sound or see an image, a perfect unity exists between the act of hearing and that which is heard and the act of seeing and that which is seen. The reality of a body as a body is determined or it is specified by how it is experienced by us through a given act of sense.

For instance, by way of illustrations that have been frequently used by other authors, the body or the matter of a mouse exists as a specific kind of datum which can be sensed (it exists as a configuration of body, having a characteristic shape; or, in other words, it has a bodily unity that is peculiar to it) and the bodily unity of a mouse is to be clearly distinguished from the body or the matter of a fox (which can also be sensed and experienced to have a bodily unity that is peculiar to it). A fox can capture and it can eat a mouse and so the body of a mouse disappears. It becomes a part of a fox’s body. A mouse ceases to exist as a distinct being (in its material individuality) but its bodyliness or its materiality is to be viewed as a substratum or as a remainder which has been incorporated into the materiality of another body (the materiality of another animal). Similarly, by way of another example, if, at one time, marble was taken from quarries and carved into statues which were then erected in the ancient Roman Forum, at a later time in history, these same statues were taken down and they were broken into pieces so that their material ingredients could be used to make lime. Hence: that which exists as matter is something which is constantly experiencing change. Continually, it undergoes change and transformations within the context of the world that we happen to live in as, sequentially, it becomes a part of other bodies (participating in the being of other bodily unities) although the matter which undergoes this kind of transformation remains that which it is as a deposit or as a substratum (existing as matter). In the burning of wood, the matter which exists in wood is turned into the kind of matter which exists for us as ashes. A mouse ceases to exist as a distinct being (in its material individuality) but its bodyliness or its materiality is to be viewed as a substratum or as a remainder which has been incorporated into the materiality of another body (the materiality of another animal). Similarly, by way of another example, if, at one time, marble was taken from quarries and carved into statues which were then erected in the ancient Roman Forum, at a later time in history, these same statues were taken down and they were broken into pieces so that their material ingredients could be used to make lime. Hence: that which exists as matter is something which is constantly experiencing change. Continually, it undergoes change and transformations within the context of the world that we happen to live in as, sequentially, it becomes a part of other bodies (participating in the being of other bodily unities) although the matter which undergoes this kind of transformation remains that which it is as a deposit or as a substratum (existing as matter). In the burning of wood, the matter which exists in wood is turned into the kind of matter which exists for us as ashes. According to a law or a principle which speaks about the “conservation of matter”

impositions of intelligibility work with naturally existing processes in ways which can add to the intelligibility of these same processes and the result can be the creation or the emergence of new realities which would exist as composites of human invention and of the naturally existing kinds of endowment that we find within the given order of things that is given to us within our naturally existing world. A given thing can exist as a humanly engineered product and, at the same time, it can exist as a species of naturally existing object because it can exist as a consequence of procedures or processes that participate in the intelligibility of naturally existing processes. The cultivation or the development of these processes does not violate the intelligibility which already belongs to the existence of these naturally existing processes.

For further information, please read into footnote 50 which attempts to speak about why some artificially existing things can be regarded as specifications of substance or thing and why, in their own way, these substances or things would also differ from things that could be lacking in what is meant when we speak about the meaning of substance or thing.

27Stewart, p. 165.

28Stewart, p. 165. Please note however, as a preliminary observation at this point that, while material or empirical differences which distinguish individuals from each other are all explained by differences that are grounded in spatial and temporal co-ordinates which are known by us through our differing acts of sense, matter functioning or serving as a principle of individuation, sense (acts of sense) cannot explain why individuality exists or why experiences of individuality belong to sense
which exists amidst change, the matter always remains or it always endures despite what changes occur and even if these changes are not understood by us in a way which would entirely satisfy the kind of interest which we could have about the nature and meaning of change.

With respect then to the existence of bodies and to the experience which we have of them as bodies, when a thing which is known to exist for us initially as a body is known or if it is understood apart from its bodyliness or when we grasp or apprehend it not through our various human acts of sensing but, principally, through our acts of understanding, then, by this move, we immediately move from “things as bodies” toward “things as things” or, equivalently, toward “things as substances.” Through a bodyliness which we directly experience and know about through our various acts of human sensing (its terms refer to the being or the presence of empirical or material conjugates, the conjugates exist as material determinations), then, through our later acts of inquiry and through possible acts of understanding which can be given us, we can now move toward something else which totally differs from that which had existed for us as a body. This something else differs from that which had been known by us through material determinations of one kind or another. This new something else that is known transcends the givenness, the presence, or the being of every kind of material determination. Through inquiry and understanding, that which had been sensed now begins to exist for us as some other kind of being since it is specified by determinations that are lacking in materiality. The determinations exist as immaterial determinations or as determinations which exist as intellectual or spiritual determinations. The intellectual determinations refer to spiritual determinations and vice versa. The kind of unity which is possessed by this second kind of being refers to a unity which can be delimited as something which is immaterial, spiritual, and intellectual. Its unity belongs to another kind of order (to another order of being) although, admittedly, the unity which it has reveals itself to us through a possible bodyliness which it can have or through a bodyliness which possibly it has had in percepts in a way which precludes other kind of cognitive acts since, in terms of explanation, the desired explanation is not itself a datum of sense. Cf. Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 10, a. 5. As the Scottish philosopher, David Hume, would have it in his understanding of human cognition, in our acts of sense, we can only say to ourselves that we encounter “impressions and sensations” and nothing more. Cf. Andrew Beards, Philosophy: the Quest for Truth and Meaning (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2010), p. 84. At times, yes, we can speak about groupings or “bundles of fleeting impressions.” However, to experience a conglomeration or a combination of things is not to experience a unity that can exist among a conglomeration of different things. No grouping, no bundle, and no association of impressions and sensations is to be identified with that which exists as a unity because unities are more than that which is simply given to us when we refer to groupings, bundles, or associations of one kind or another. That which exists as a unity can only be known if, in some way, we can refer or point to the legitimacy or the authority of some other kind of cognitive act. The desired explanation would not exist as a datum of sense but as a datum of our minds, our intellects, or our understanding (as the term of an act of insight or the term of an act of understanding) as this exists for us within the experience which we have of ourselves (experiencing our intellectual consciousness) and from the kind of self-understanding which exists within our knowing which should know about the different kind of knowing which exists among our acts of sensing versus the different kind of knowing which exists among other cognitive acts: acts which differ from our acts of human sensing when they transcend or when they sublate that which is first given to us whenever we are in a condition of act with respect to our different acts of human sensing.

the past (a bodyliness which we have encountered or a bodyliness which, perhaps, we will eventually encounter). That which exists with a material or bodily unity is not unconnected (it is not unjoined or it is not unrelated) to that which exists for us with a specification of unity which refers to the existence of a spiritual or intellectual unity.

In other words and with a greater degree of specificity, we would say that a thing or body which is directly related to our acts of sensing differs from a thing or a substance which is directly related to our acts of understanding (direct acts of understanding leading to reflective acts of understanding in a manner which completes the initial kind of understanding which we have when we refer to our first acts of understanding). Things or substances are known by us as things or substances in terms of how they can be related to one or more objects which are known by us apart from how they are directly related to our various acts of human sensing. Within the order and within the development of our human cognition, something other which is external to us first exists for us as a body before it can begin to exist for us as a distinct, separate thing (or as a distinct, separate substance). To illustrate the difference which exists between a body and a thing (a substance), a dog as a body is to be distinguished from a dog as a thing or substance.

As a body, a dog is known: it is sensed in its spatial totality. In temporal terms, this concrete totality is immediately perceived by us and it is known by us through our various acts of human sensing and through apprehensions of depth perception which exist within our acts of sense perception. But, as a thing or substance, when a dog is understood as if it exists as a thing or substance, properties are added to the materiality of a dog's body in a manner which not only distinguishes a dog from other kinds of being (dogs differ from cats) but which also points to the intelligibility of a dog's nature, the intelligibility of a dog's being (the reasons, the explanations, or the causes that make a dog a dog; reasons, explanations, or causes which explain why this body or this matter is in fact a dog and not some other kind of being). Reasons which exist as terms of acts of understanding explain why dogs exist in the way that they do and why they typically behave in the ways which they do and why they happen to have the kind of bodies which, in fact, they normally and typically have. Fido, the dog, ceases to be only a body; Fido, the dog, becomes a thing or a substance when we begin to think about the entirety of Fido's life, from beginning to end, starting from conception and birth and moving on into maturation, decline, and eventual death. The information that

---


31 Stewart, p. 167.

32 For a detailed explanation which works with many distinctions to explain how, through a series of differing aspects and profiles, our physical senses are able to know about the identity of a datum with respect to the givenness of its physical or material unity, see Robert Sokolowski's *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 20-21, and see how he explains this species of apprehension within a phenomenological analysis that is implicitly employed by us if we should ever want to speak about the nature of our sensible experience and about how this experience occurs in ways which reveal how or why we can say that, within a given set of sensed data, each datum points to the same thing or the same object: an identical material unity which a given thing happens to have as a body (the unity of a body being other than the unity of a thing or the unity of a substance). When distinct acts of sensing exist as a continuum of these same acts, from a continuum which is present within these acts, we also have a continuum which is present within our sensed data and so, within the experience of this continuum, we immediately move from experiences of profiles or aspects to a bodily unity which always belongs to an externally existing object that is being sensed by us at a given time within a given place amidst a given set of circumstances.
we accumulate and which we can come to have about Fido is something which does not exist for us if we were to try and restrict our inquiry and our acts of cognition to that which is simply given to us in either one act of sense or through an aggregate of different acts of sense.

To understand more fully the kind of unity which belongs to a thing or substance (the kind of unity which distinguishes things or substances from that which exists as a body), let us specify more fully what is meant by that which exists as an “intelligible unity” which is grasped not within a continuum of data that is given to us by a continuum which exists among our different acts of sense but which, instead, is grasped by us within and among diverse sets of data that are experienced by us at different times through differing acts of sensing, an act of sensing here and another act of sensing there. 33 Briefly and bluntly, the “notion of a thing [or substance] is grounded in an insight [an act of direct understanding] that grasps, not relations between data, but a unity, identity, whole in data [a unity, identity, whole which exists within data].” 34 No notion of a thing or substance can be grasped within a context which refers to a single datum of sense. In other words, if a unity within the data of sense, if a unity within sense data exists as a unity within space, we always have a body. We consciously experience a body and the spatial unity which properly belongs to the coordinates of a body's size (its measurements, its dimensions). To understand thus how this unity is constituted (we refer here to a key point of difference), if we should engage in a personal experiment that we can conduct with respect to ourselves and if we should enter into a phenomenological analysis of self, we should notice that, in a given single act of sense, in one given act of seeing, we immediately experience two dimensions: an experience of height is given to us and an experience of width is also given to us. In one shot or in a snapshot, we behold one profile. We perceive one profile, one aspect. But, if additional acts of seeing are then added to our first acts of seeing, then from a moving point of view which turns about or which moves about or around an external object which is sensed by us from a context that begins with initial acts of seeing, we immediately move from two dimensions to an experience of three dimensions: experiences of height, width, and depth. A bodily unity is experienced and it is known by us through an apperception of unity which is given to us through a continuum which belongs to single acts of sense. One or more acts of sense are joined to preceding, initial acts of sense. In this type of self-analysis, we should discover or we should come upon a distinction which distinguishes between that which exists as sense and that which exists as perception. Through a continuum of different acts of sense which are successively and proximately related to each other, we perceive bodies: this body or that body. As we have been noting, the kind of unity which is experienced defines what is meant by bodies. A continuum which exists within time is correlated or it is manifested through a species of continuum which exists within our acts of sense, joining a given act of sense with other acts of sense. The difference in the form or the manner of constitution explains why that which exists as a material unity (a body) is to be distinguished from that which exists as an intelligible unity (intelligible unities determining that which exists as a thing or substance). The distinction is real. The difference is not about a use of different words nor is it about the meaning of different ideas.

To grasp this difference more clearly, we attend to another kind of constitution which refers to the being or the genesis of intelligible unities and how or why we can speak about the possible reality of

---


things or substances and not about the reality of bodies. Again, if we attend to our experience of self and if we attend to the kind of experience which we have when we experience our acts of understanding (as these are given to us), we should notice that, in our first acts of understanding (in our acts of direct understanding), a unity is given to us as the proper term of our acts of understanding. In our acts of direct understanding (if we should want to be precise and not confuse our direct acts of understanding with the reflective kind of understanding which exists in our judgments), a diversity which is experienced at the level of sense is reduced to a unity that is not seen but which, now, is understood. Hence, from this, we have an intelligible unity. We experience an intelligible unity. The unity is not experienced through our acts of sense but through our acts of understanding since, in all our acts of direct understanding, an unseen unity is encountered (possibly for the first time) and so, as a result, we encounter or, cognitively, we experience a unity which exists in a way that is both within time and which is also outside of time, a unity which transcends time and which cuts across time and temporality, a unity which is also lacking in the givenness of spatial coordinates. The kind of unity which it has does not exist within a continuum of space.

With respect then to the question of time (to avoid misunderstanding), because, in a direct act of understanding, an intelligible unity is immediately given to it as its proper and adequate term (every act of understanding has a term which refers to that which is understood and that which is understood always exists through the mediation of an act of understanding), it is not necessary that we should receive additional acts of direct understanding in order to experience the kind of unity which belongs to that which exists for us as an intelligible unity. Additional acts of direct understanding can reveal (they will reveal) new intelligible unities and, by knowing about these unities, we can add to the intelligible unity that is already known by us (having been grasped by us through a prior act of understanding). We admit, as an undoubted fact (because we are contingent beings), that all our acts of understanding occur within time. We have this act of understanding at this time and this other act of understanding at this other time. However, whenever a direct act of understanding is given to us, an intelligible unity is immediately given to us in all its fullness or integrity as a unity. Elements or parts are related to each other in an unseen way. The time that it takes to experience the unity of a body is transcended or it is surpassed and replaced by a fullness or an an immediacy which exists with respect to our acts of understanding (an immediacy which joins us to an intelligible experience of unity that is immediately given to us through our acts of understanding, within the kind of order which belongs to the nature or the structure of our human cognition). Hence, with respect to the kind of relation which exists between our acts of sense and our acts of direct understanding, relative to the kind of order or the manner of constitution which exists with respect to our acts of sense, in all our acts of understanding, time is always being transcended. As a sign and proof of this, if we attend again to our experience of self, when we read into the philosophy and thought of persons who have lived centuries before our own day and time, we should notice both the historicity of their meaning (how they expressed and spoke about their understanding of different things) and, at the same time too, the enduring significance and the enduring truth of that which these same persons have grasped and known within the context of their own day and time. Wherever human beings exist and whenever they enjoy acts of understanding, something happens within us which transcends conditions that are determined by considerations of space and time.

With respect then to questions about space, in the same way too, space is transcended through our acts of understanding which encounter intelligible unities because the unity which we experience through our transcending acts of understanding differs from the kind of spatial presence or the spatial extension
which belongs to perceived bodies that are known by us through our various acts of sense.\textsuperscript{35} Where the material unity of a body is subject to change or corruption (bodies come and go in a manner which is directly known by us through our acts of sense), as a point of contrast, the intelligible unity of a thing or, more simply, the unity of a thing or substance is something which tends to endure through time (as an intelligibility). The unity of a thing is known and it exists despite what changes can often occur as we move from one time frame to another (or as we move from one experience of presence to other sensible experiences of presence). In another way of speaking, we can say that the empirical properties which are known by us through our various acts of sense differ through time and space although, despite how they differ and as much as they may differ, they can all ultimately refer to the same intelligible unity which exists as a thing or substance but which, as a thing or substance, “does not show itself [for what it is] as itself.”\textsuperscript{36} The thing or substance, essentially, is something which can never be sensed or imagined as often or as much as we would want to picture it or to imagine it in our ordinary way of thinking and knowing since the kind of reality which it has is qualified or, better still, we say that it is determined by the reality of intelligible or rational considerations and not by means of the kind of agency which exists if we should limit our considerations to that which exists for us as “matter in motion” and the kind of activity or operation which is suggested when we try to refer to the presence or the activity of “matter in motion.” More is known than this. Realities, in one sense, are more real to the degree that they are constituted by that which exists as intelligibility and, in another sense, realities are more real to the degree that we can move into our acts of understanding (enjoying

\textsuperscript{35} Lonergan, \textit{Understanding and Being}, 1987 Morelli edition, p. 126. Please note here that, as an activity, questioning (which tends to lead toward understanding) transcends or it goes beyond that which is given to us through our acts of sense. We go beyond that which is simply given to us in our various acts of sense. And, in our questioning, we can ask what and why questions in a manner which gradually begins to distinguish between that which exists as a part and that which exists as a whole or greater unity. For instance, we might want to understand what happens when something is burned. What kind of change occurs when, through fire, a given thing is converted into ashes? In the science of chemistry, we want to learn about chemical transformations and the nature of chemical transformations. How do we account for a type of motion or type of movement which does not exist as a species of locomotion? However, in attempting to ask these kinds of questions, we gradually discover a division within data when we find that some specifications of data (or some specifications of being) exist to the degree that they exist within something else which is other while other specifications of data (or other specifications of being) refer to wholes or units which exist in an autonomous fashion. In a very simple example of this, in his \textit{Quest for Self-Knowledge}, p. 112, Joseph Flanagan distinguishes between a leaf or the branch of a tree and a tree (a plant). No leaf or branch can exist independently of any tree which exists as a whole (as a plant). In discovering how our inquiry begins to distinguish between that which exists as a whole within data and that which exists as a part which inheres or which belongs to a whole within data, from questions which ask about a unity which exists within data, through the asking of further questions, we can eventually enter into a shift of consciousness which takes us from an initial experience of bodies toward apprehensions which know about how bodies can exist as things or substances. To avoid any misunderstanding here, we can say that, by a kind of addition, the ingress of understanding converts a body into a thing or substance. Then, through the mediation which exists when we refer to that which we know about when we speak about a thing or substance, we can refer specifically to that which exists for us when we think again about bodies and the kind of experience which is given to us in sense when we refer to the being of bodies.

direct acts of understanding and then moving, from there, into reflective acts of understanding).

To conclude then this section or first step that deals with the nature of things or substances in opposition or in contrast to that which exists as bodies, please note that this kind of discussion is of no value at all to anyone if readers should decide to restrict themselves to the mere meanings of words. When we attend to the meanings of words, yes, an experience of meaning does exist for us. We admittedly move from inferences toward conclusions in a way that does not violate any logical principles, any logical rules. No contradictions exist which, if present, would point to an absence or a lack of understanding. However, these things being said, if we do not advert to our own acts of understanding; if, explicitly or implicitly, we tend to believe that immaterial acts of understanding take us away from reality and not towards reality; if, in some way, we should hold to a positivist, reductionist understanding of the human mind which does not distinguish between acts of sense and acts of understanding (the nature which properly belongs to acts of sense versus the nature which properly belongs to acts of understanding), we will probably not move toward an understanding of that which is meant by “thing” or “substance” in a way which will change how we engage in any kind of inquiry that we would want to do as human subjects: how we should think and understand and how we should look upon the world. If the Church's teaching about transubstantiation is not widely understood and appreciated for what it is as a wise and true teaching, could the reason be that defective assumptions are operative in the kind of approach that is often used by both believers and unbelievers in any kind of inquiry that attempts to ask about the meaning of transubstantiation? It is not without reason then that, in order to guard and to protect the truth of her received teaching, the Church claims that she has both the right and the duty (the responsibility) to identify and then to censure “philosophic teachings which directly or indirectly endanger [the Church's] dogma.”37 A fundamental principle says that, in fact or in some way, all good things come from God. On the one hand, through the truths of revelation, God reveals himself to us, and then, on the other hand, through the being and the truth of contingent, created things, God reveals himself to us in another way and this other way includes how, as human beings, we engage in acts of inquiry and in our different acts of human cognition. No contradiction should exist between these two ways or these two orders or, alternatively or in other words, no contradiction can legitimately exist between the created order of things and the order of our human redemption and salvation. We think about these things as we ponder and think about a teaching that comes to us from the First Vatican Council as this is given to us in its *Dogmatic Constitution concerning the Catholic Faith*:

...the Church which, along with the apostolic office of teaching, received the charge of guarding the deposit of faith has also from God the right and the duty to proscribe what is falsely called knowledge [cf. 1 Tim 6:20], lest anyone be deceived by philosophy and vain fallacy [cf. Col 2:8].38

from one kind of substance or thing to another kind of substance or thing

From an understanding which accordingly knows that substances or things are known by us initially through our acts of direct understanding and that the truth or the reality of substances or things is grasped by us through consequent acts of reflective understanding, an understanding of change now

37 Ott, 9.
presents itself to us as both a requirement and a challenge if we are to understand how or why we can know and speak about a species or a type of change which allegedly exists as a substantial kind of change. One kind of substance or thing allegedly becomes another kind of substance or thing. However, before entering into the reasons, the rationality, or the causes which belong to this kind of change, some preliminary remarks are needed if we are to understand change in a way which can note how an understanding of change elicits or leads us toward a notion of being which is to be identified with that which exists for us as a substance or thing. As a point of contrast, a descriptive account of change is limited with respect to the terms of meaning which it employs. Strictly speaking, such an account only refers to the kind of data which exists for us and which is known by us through our different acts of human sensing. However, in order to move from a description of change toward an explanation of change, in our explanation, something needs to be said about how, through an understanding and explanation of change, we can move or we must move toward a notion of being which is the being of substances or the being of things which exist as substances. From the haziness or the fluidity of data which is perceived by us when different acts of sense are joined to each other within a continuum of differing but related acts of sense, as we have noticed or as we should have by now already noticed, according to the kind of manner which belongs to the kind of operation which exists within our differing acts of direct understanding, within our acts of understanding a unity is grasped within our perceptions of sensed data. A unity is found to exist within our data, an intelligible unity among sensible unities or, in other words, a substance or a thing that relates bodies with each other and which reveals or points to an ordering which can exist among bodies and which can explain why, in some cases, some bodies exist within other bodies.

With respect then to an understanding of change which differs from a description of change, as a point of departure, it is argued that if change is to be regarded as a reality which transcends whatever is given to us as terms which belong to our acts of sense, then, if we are to have an understanding of change, we need to recall how, already, we have distinguished between that which exists as a body and that which exists as a thing or substance. With respect to change, change cannot be understood if it is reduced to that which happens whenever we have “the substitution of one datum for another,” nor can change be understood if it is reduced to that which happens whenever we have “the replacement of one concept by another.” These substitutions or successions, without doubt, all occur. They all happen. In the consciousness which exists within our various acts of sensing, we undoubtedly experience differences within the data of sense (constantly shifting variations in the data that are given to us on a “moment to moment basis”). Our acts of sense are intrinsically conditioned by varying circumstances of time and place (a condition which refers to an immovable, unavoidable substrate which exists for us and which is known in words which speak about an “empirical residue”). If we strictly hold to that which our senses are continually reporting to us, we will constantly experience sequences of stages within a succession where, strictly speaking, no one stage is necessarily related to a second or third stage. In this type of scenario, again, strictly speaking, that which exists as a first being would be completely annihilated and that which exists as a second being would be brought into existence out of nothing that has anything to do with a first being that had been known by us (presented to us) through our prior acts of sense.

However, if we should want to talk about change as an intelligible thing (if a real distinction in fact

exists between change and chaos, if a real distinction distinguishes change from an ongoing stream of substitutions and successions that are given to us within the data of our sensing consciousness), then we will need to be able to say that, within a stream of substitutions and successions, some kind of unity exists among the differences which exist within our experiences of sense data (a unity that can join all differences into a oneness that exists both within our understanding and within the data that we are understanding, an understanding which has been elicited and provoked because we are asking questions about that which could exist as a larger whole rather than about that which exists as only a part or an element).\textsuperscript{41} According to the teaching thus which has come down to us from Aquinas and according to the degree of self-understanding that we may each have of our own acts of understanding, the oneness \textit{as substance or thing} exists as a principle of organization. As a unifying intelligible unity, it refers to a potential center of activity (more specifically and more accurately, it refers to a possible center of action and passion or, in other words, “a [possible] center of acting and being acted upon”).\textsuperscript{42} A given act or activity belongs to this central unity and it often belongs to this unity although, as we encounter other acts or other activities, these can belong to some other intelligible unity which we have yet to come to know about and identify as another possible center of activity. This act or this activity properly belongs to this central unity but not this other act or this other species of activity. For example: the kind of seeing which belongs to birds of prey probably belongs to that which exists as a hawk or eagle while other kinds of seeing belong to other beings who exist as distinct substances (or distinct things).

In attending then to determinations of change, as we think about this species of intelligible oneness which exists as a substance or thing and if we should want to think about how this oneness relates or how it interacts with all the differences that, empirically, we could be sensing at any given time, we can think about this unity as a being, as a reality, or as a thing which participates or which shares in all these many differences. In some way, all the different differences belong to it. Or, more accurately, we should say (about these differences) that they all participate in this one being, this one reality, or this one thing (although, as suggested, in different ways and according to different degrees). But, if these same differences all participate in a unity which transcends the being of each difference and which joins each difference to sets of other differences, then, as we have already noted, we must speak about a reality (a thing) which transcends differences of space and time. Its identity never changes amid the many conditions which are determined by the presence of spatial and temporal coordinates. However, at the same time, whenever this kind of being exists as a subject, precisely in its existence as a subject, it changes every time it does something new (each act, as an act, always differs from another act that is being done by a subject as a subject). A subject as a receiver also differs when it receives acts that

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{41}Clarke, p. 129.
\textsuperscript{42}Clarke, p. 129. Please distinguish between substances or things which exist as living beings (hence, as subjects of change) and substances or things which do not exist as living beings (existing not as subjects or as doers of change but as receivers or receptors of change). For examples, we can distinguish between bread and wine as these are known to us initially as bodies (their unity can be sensed) although, when they are understood by us through our acts of direct understanding and when they are affirmed by us through our acts of reflective understanding, they exist now as substances or things. Hence, as these examples should show, we should not say that these substances exist as initiators of change (as subjects of change or action) although we can say that, as substances or things, they can be acted upon from without in ways which can differ. The manner of reception can change the identity of a given substance or thing or the manner of reception can add to the being of a given substance or thing.
differ from each other (an act here and an act there in a succession of differing receptions). But, on the other hand, when a being is considered apart from its subjectivity, when it is considered simply as a being, a reality, or a thing which exists as an identity whether or not it is doing any particular act or whether it is receiving any particular act (whether, as a being, it experiences different acts or it does different acts, shifting from one set of acts to another set of acts), then we must speak about it in a way which refers to an abiding form of self-identity (a self-identity that never changes and which always holds). Hence, within this context, we speak about a substantial kind of identity (an identity which substantially exists). In one sense, yes, a being as a thing changes (in some way, it is growing, it is evolving, it is regressing, or it is declining) but, in another sense, in a substantial sense, it never changes even as we realize and know (in agreement with Aquinas) that a given being (a given thing or a given substance) exists not in order simply to exist but, principally, in order to exercise or to live out the kind of individual existence which it happens to have. Mere existence is not to be equated with the fullness of being or with fullness of existence. In Aquinas's own words: “every substance [every being] exists for the sake of its operations [for the sake of its activities].” Similarly too, in the words of Aquinas: “each and every thing shows forth that it exists for the sake of its operations; indeed, operation [act] is the ultimate perfection of each thing.”

With respect then to the positive relation which exists between that which exists as change and that which exists as substance or thing, to experience some degree of verification which we can have as human subjects, in the consciousness that we have of ourselves as living human subjects, in the consciousness that we have of our self-presence (our self-identity), we should realize that we never cease to be the same being or the same person that we happen to be in the course of our personal histories (even as we also realize that, as persons, as human beings, we are constantly changing in how we are living and acting as human subjects). Our personalities can go through some very radical changes or they can avoid experiencing some very radical changes: changes which refer to how we may view and judge ourselves and concomitant changes in how we may view and judge how we should relate to the world which surrounds us. Lack of change in who we are goes with very many changes in how, as subjects, we happen to be.

Hence, on the basis of this experience and the experience which we have of others and of the external world that is about us, when one kind of change occurs and the self-identity of a given being is not effected in any way, we speak about accidental changes or about non-substantial changes. “Accident” signifies this type of change according to the traditional use of this terminology; “conjugate,” this type of change according to a more contemporary way of speaking. Accidental, conjugate changes come and go. You or I could be doing one thing at a given time and something else at another time. But, if we should want to think about the kind of change which extinguishes the being or the identity of a given thing as a substance or thing, then we should think about that which exists as an essential or as a substantial kind of change which occurs whenever some kind of substratum or some principle of reception is informed by something which comes to it or whenever it receives a new principle of organization which creates or which effects a new unity within an assembly of data, a unity which presents itself to us as a new substantial form and which, if real, should have a proportionate act of being or a proportionate act of existence which immediately refers to the truth or the reality of its existence. A new substantial form, as it exists within data, points to the being of a new thing or the

43Clarke, pp. 127-129.
44Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a, q. 105, a. 5.
45Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 3, 113, as cited by Clarke, p. 129.
being of a new substance. If bodies exist within bodies (according to the kind of testimony or the information which comes to us from our differing acts of sense), a thing or substance cannot exist within another thing or substance since, by a substance or thing, we refer to a general principle of organization or a larger principle of unity which brings or which converts a collection or an aggregate of parts, elements, or pieces into a unity which is signified whenever we refer to that which exists as a substance or thing.\textsuperscript{46} While more than one body can exist within a thing or substance or, in another way of speaking, when we say that bodies exist as functions of things or as functions of substances (the bodies are endowed with a potency or an openness, a directedness or a species of finality belongs to them, they are directed toward that which exists as a distinct substance or thing), on the other hand, we cannot say that a thing or a substance exists within a body. Things or substances do not exist as functions of bodies (as if things or substances are produced by bodies). As we have already noticed, the reality of a body is not the reality of a thing or substance although the reality of bodies (the givenness or experience of bodies) does suggest or points to a greater reality which exists and which we can come to know about whenever we refer to the reality of that which exists as a thing or substance.

To understand now how a given substance or thing can be converted to become another substance or thing (hence, the literal meaning of transubstantiation), please note here (as a point of departure) that the intelligible unity of a substance or thing is known if we can grasp or come to know about a set of accidental or conjugate properties which, together, explain why a given thing exists as a particular kind of thing and not as some other kind of thing (having its own properties and not some other set of properties which belong to the reality of another thing or substance). For instance, to illustrate what is meant here, biological botanical laws which refer to accidental properties or biological botanical laws which refer to botanical conjugates explain why plants exist as distinct beings, with a unity which refers to plants in terms of how they exist as distinct things or as distinct substances (differing from other things or substances). These accidents or conjugates explain the ongoing life of plants as things or substances (specifically, the reproduction of plant life). They explain movements or motions which pertain to how or why new possible instances of plant life can be said to come into being or existence. Within this larger context of meaning and intelligibility however, physical and chemical laws continue to exist and to hold. In the case of plants, these laws exist as “lower order properties” or as “lower order conjugates.”\textsuperscript{47} They explain physical changes and chemical changes as these exist and as they continue to occur within the life of any given plant. But, if we are to explain why plants are capable of movements which do not belong to any data or a datum that is understood when we refer to the intelligibility of physical or chemical laws, then, within this greater larger context, we must move toward a higher genus of laws or we should move toward a higher specification of law if plants are to be distinguished in a way which can indicate how, in fact, they exist as distinct things or as distinct substances: having a unity within data which intelligibly organizes lower specifications of meaning and law into an ordered unity which is determined or which is known by us as we move toward the kind of ordering which we have and which occurs if our objective is a higher genus or a higher order of laws which is proportionate to the being or to the existence of a given thing or substance. When attending, for instance, to botanical biological laws, we know that we cannot know about the kind of unity which properly and proportionately belongs to the life and being of animals. Differing things or differing substances are determined or they can only be known by us if we can move toward another higher


\textsuperscript{47}Stebbins, “Eucharistic Presence,” p. 229.
intelligible viewpoint in an ordering of lower viewpoints which would point to a succession and also an integration of viewpoints, higher viewpoints sublating the intelligibility which belongs to lower viewpoints in a way which points to the existence of a new unity (a unity which refers to the being of a new substance or the being of a new thing). A new higher or highest viewpoint turns a prior higher viewpoint into a species of lower viewpoint.

To explain what all this means as we try and point to a few examples, an oxygen molecule exists on its own as a distinct thing or as a distinct substance when it is known from a viewpoint which refers to the operation of chemical laws (the meaning and the significance of chemical laws). But, if and when this same molecule is “bonded to a molecule of hemoglobin in one of my red cells,” it ceases to be its own thing or its own substance. It has ceased to be the thing or substance which it had been before since that which it had been now exists within a greater context which refers to a larger intelligible unity which exists at a higher level of meaning and being: a unity which refers to another kind of thing or another kind of substance. The new intelligible unity which exists at a higher level as a thing or substance does not exist in a way which destroys the properties (the accidents or the conjugates) which had existed with respect to certain things or certain substances before these same things or these same substances had been dissolved and brought into the being of a higher thing or substance. In the transition which occurs, within this context, we can say that a given substance or thing is converted or that it is replaced by another species of substance or thing. A previously existing thing or a previously existing substance is annihilated (it ceases to exist) as a newly existing thing or as a newly existing substance is brought into the kind of being which belongs to the reality of its existence.

Hence, by way of application, when we turn to transubstantiation as it applies to the kind of change which occurs at Mass in the celebration of the Eucharist (to say a few words about how the better we can understand the Church’s teaching about the kind of eucharistic change which occurs at Mass), from the kind of order which exists within the rite of worship or the liturgy that exists within the order of Mass, we should see that a re-ordering of elements occurs through the introduction of a new element which serves to constitute a new relation which exists among parts or elements. This change or this introduction leads us to a new meaning. The change in meaning which occurs constitutes a new unity which comes to exist for us now as a new whole (existing as a new thing or as a new substance). On the one hand, before Mass is celebrated, bread and wine exist, allegedly, as distinct substances or as distinct things although, if we should want to speak in a more accurate way about the thingness or the substantiality of bread and wine, we would have to say that, in bread and wine, in them both, we find that each of them exists as an aggregate of substances. Bread and wine exist because they have been brought into being through the instrumentality of our human actions and so they do not exist ready made as naturally existing things or as naturally existing substances (apart from the human order of things). In the making or the production of both bread and wine, from a set of primary elements and through procedures or processes of one kind or another that initiate a series of chemical changes (one kind of chemical change producing bread, another kind of chemical change producing wine), compounds are brought into being with an intelligibility that properly belongs to them. No compound can be understood for what it is if we were to try to reduce its intelligibility to the intelligibility of parts or elements or if were to try to derive its intelligibility from the different distinct intelligibilities that

respectively belong to the differing distinct constitutive parts (the parts which exist as distinct things or which exist as distinct substances until they are bonded together in a way which takes away from the thingness or substantiality of parts in lieu of that which now comes to exist as a new thing or substance). Because a given molecule of bread or a given molecule of wine exists as a distinct substance or thing, for this reason thus, when molecules of the same kind are added together to form a conglomeration, the result is an aggregate or a sum of substances (of the same kind of substance). That which exists as bread and that which exists as wine are respectively constituted by properties or conjugate forms which point, respectively, to the intelligibility of bread and the intelligibility of wine.

When we turn then to changes in substance, a substantial change occurs when a prayer of consecration

---

50To understand this point more fully, please note with respect to the existence of artificial forms and the existence of natural forms that, when elements are brought into a species of coordination with each other or into a new unity which comes to exist among these different disparate elements, each part comes to have a meaning or an intelligibility which has been enhanced in some way. If, for instance, we attend to the being of a house or the being of a car, both admittedly exist as technological beings. Each enjoys a mechanical or a functional kind of unity. Building materials have been put together to build a house or a car and if a house or a car is destroyed or if it is demolished in some way, if the mechanical unity is dissolved, functionally speaking, the building materials return to the status which, formerly, they have always had or, more accurately, we would say that they retain the status which they have always had as substances or things (a status which they have never lost). The stone always remains as stone; metal, as metal. Functionally speaking, the stone which had been used, for instance, to build a house returns to what it had been before it had been used as pliable construction material. No substantial change can be adverted to (no change exists in that which exists as the form of stone) although, admittedly, the stone no longer exists within a larger greater context which refers to the external form of a house although this same stone can be taken up at a later time and date and used by somebody else to construct a new building, imposing a new external form that would belong to the design of this new construction.

However, when we move from a physics of external change toward a chemistry of internal change, two kinds of artifact need to be distinguished from each other if we are to distinguish between that which exists as simple things and compound things (or if we are to distinguish between simple substances and compound substances), and if we are to notice that some artifacts are to be regarded as substances or things when their parts or elements undergo a change of form which takes away the thingness or the substantiality of parts when the intelligibility of simple substances is replaced by a larger or more comprehensive intelligibility which belongs to the nature or the being of a compound thing or substance. Depending on the kind of change which occurs or the kind of change which is needed, one kind of object is realized within a given context and another kind of object, in another context. With respect to these two different kinds of being (which both exist as artifacts), a difference in the order of their constitution would point to differing judgments which must be made if we are to understand and know about the status of a given object: specifically for us, if a given type of artifact is to be regarded as a substance. Does it have a substantial kind of reality which would distinguish it as a distinct substance and which would distinguish it also from other kinds of being which would not exist as substances? Hence, when we turn to a context which is determined by externally existing physical motions, externally existing objects are moved about through space and in time in a way which relates these objects to each other, combining them in ways which join parts or elements together into a new specification of physical unity. The result is the being of a new physical thing and this being is known
is uttered over bread and wine by a validly ordained priest. As a consequence, the bread and wine are converted. As eucharistic elements, they now exist in a new way. They enjoy a passivity or they exist as passivities that are taken up into a higher species of intelligible unity which now directly refers to the supernatural intelligibility of Christ's body and blood. We cannot say that, directly, we understand this intelligibility. However, as a consequence of eucharistic substantial change, a new “unity, identity, whole” presents itself and this new unity refers to the being of Christ's person. The properties of bread and wine remain in terms of their physical and chemical conjugates (their conjugate forms). Their appearances do not change when we refer to that which is given to us through our different acts of sense although, now, the properties of bread and wine or the conjugates of bread and wine belong, they inhere, or they participate in the being of a new higher unity which incorporates these lower orders

by us directly through our differing acts of sense. As a technological being, as an expression or as a communication of our human understanding and meaning, it possesses an imposed nature or an imposed intelligibility which properly belongs to it. Its nature is derived from the physical kind of change which has been used to bring this physical unity into the existence which, currently, it now has (as it transitions from a prior condition of potency toward a current condition of act). As always, whenever we refer in general to technological beings, its form has been imposed from without through the work and the activity of external agents. On the one hand, yes, the constitutive parts or the constitutive elements are enhanced in the meaning or the intelligibility which now belongs to them. If a stone is taken and if it is carved in a manner which turns it into a keystone that is used to construct an arch or vault, we would have to admit that a given piece of stone has been given a new function or that it meets a purpose which, previously, it did not have. However, amidst this change, as we have noted, the thingness of the stone or the substantiality of the stone remains. It endures. The modifications which are received fail to change the identity of what stone is as stone or what the stone has been as stone. No changes in the form or the intelligibility of a thing occur although, admittedly, a given thing (a given thing which exists as a body or which exists as a mass or as an aggregate of substances) now serves a higher purpose. Changes occur (changes have been implemented) but no substantial changes can be admitted or adverted to when we attend to materials which have been used to effect or to construct the being of a new physical unity.

However, what happens when, through our human intervention, in combining distinct substances with each other, the result is not the concatenation of a new physical unity but, instead, a unity which exists as a compound of simple, single elements? As performatively we attempt to distinguish between simple things or substances and compound things or substances, a simple substance or a simple thing is something which cannot be reduced to composite elements, parts, ingredients that are somehow joined or bonded to each other in some kind of distinct way. For example, by itself, hydrogen exists as a distinct, simple substance and oxygen also exists as a distinct, simple substance. They do not exist as compositions or as a consequence of compositions which would have us say that a certain amount of this has been joined to a certain amount of that within a context that is determined by an interaction of some kind which allegedly exists between these two simple elements. Simple substances are not constituted (in each in their own way) by two or more elements that are put together in some way through a procedure that respectively creates them to be what they happen to be.

However, on the other hand, through changes which occur in a given place (without the need for changes in place or position or locomotions of one kind or another) and through changes which also occur immediately or instantaneously, the result is a new species of change which, in turn, points to a
of intelligibility into a greater, larger whole which is the intelligibility or the being of Christ's body and blood. In other words, bread and wine (which have existed in their own way as substances) have been turned into another species of substance which is the real being, the “thingness,” or the substantial presence of Christ's body and blood (Christ who exists as a divine person).

In this context, the words of the priest function as an operative principle or as a species of constitutive cause when he says, as Our Lord himself had said at the Last Supper: “This is my body,” not “This bread is my body.” Through the perpetuation and the implementation of a divine intention, in this way, by this means, the reality or the being of bread and wine is simply replaced (it is wholly and

new species of object as their proper legitimate effect. Some changes exist as inner changes or as internal transformations and so, within this context, elements are combined with each other in a way which points to the emergence of a new intelligible unity which explains why a new thing exists in the way that it happens to exist. The unity is intelligible because it points to a proportion or an ordering of parts or elements which explains how or why a given thing or substance is to be viewed as a compound specification of unity and thus, in other words, as a compound substance. If, in a given case, in encountering parts as parts or in encountering elements as elements we encounter a multiplicity (if, at one level, we experience this multiplicity), then, within a possible ordering of all the parts or a possible ordering of all the elements, in the ordering which can join the parts, we can encounter a unity which exists at a higher level: a unity which exists as an intelligibility. The unity is not a datum of sense. The unity is not sensible or physical. It is something greater (something more) because it is grasped by us through our acts of understanding and not through our prior acts of sensing. The unity which is known exists as the unity of a compound thing or it exists as the unity of a compound substance. By employing procedures that are already known to us as a consequence of human history and past human discovery, or by introducing new processes that we can understand, devise, and implement, new compound things or new compound substances can be brought into a new condition of being and sometimes too, an existing compound thing or an existing compound substance can reduced to their prior, constitutive elements. Relatively speaking, the elements would exist as simple things or they would exist as simple substances. While hydrogen and oxygen as simple distinct substances or as simple distinct things can be joined together in a way which makes for the emergence of water as a new distinct thing or as a new distinct substance, through electrolysis, water can separated in a way which reduces its being to that which had existed substantially as the thingness of hydrogen and the thingness of oxygen. Substantial changes occur when chemical changes occur.

In all these cases thus, when attending to chemical kinds of changes and when attending to changes which suppose chemical changes and which exist as other specifications of change, without the introduction of a new centralizing form (which would function as a species of substantial form or as a species of central form), the parts or elements of a thing would be unable to attain the new kind of reality which they have come to have and enjoy, a reality which they can only have if, in some way, a substantial central form is present as a new unity within an assembly of parts or elements that can be referred to at times (relatively speaking) as an assembly of data. In any given case, subtract a pertinent substantial central form and every part which exists as a constitutive part would cease to exist for what it has become as a distinctive part or element. Its reality would be diminished or it would be lessened in some way. If, for example, a living thing undergoes death (if it ceases to exist), then its parts cease to exist for what they have been as parts (having an intelligibility which is proper to them as parts). Cf. Aquinas, On Generation and Corruption, bk 1, lect. 15, para. 108. The eye of a living being
entirely replaced)53 by that which exists as a new reality which, in its reality, immediately points to a newly presence which is the Real Presence of Christ's body and blood. Through a change which occurs initially within the order of meaning or within the order of intelligibility (through a change which introduces a higher order of meaning and being into a lower order of meaning and being), a change has been effected within the order of real things.54 The introduction of new conjugate forms changes the reality of a given thing or substance and, as a consequence, that which has existed as different substances or things (as bread and wine) is converted into elements which now belong to the being of a new kind of substance or thing as this exists for us in the being of Christ's glorified body and blood.55 Echoing words which have come to us from the 1215 Fourth Lateran Council, bread and wine have been transubstantiated into the being of Christ's body and blood. And so, when we speak about which has existed as a part cannot be identified with the eye of a corpse. It no longer performs the same functions. It ceases to have the same reality. Flesh and bones belonging to a corpse cannot be equated with the reality of flesh and bones which belong to a living being. Hence, with Aquinas, we would say that the substantial form or the central form of beings or substances exists in a manner which is somehow prior to the being of any of its constituent parts. Something only exists as a part here if it can belong to something which exists as a whole. The whole determines that which exists as parts through the possible relations which would exist among the parts. In this way then, that which exists as a unifying form is prior to the existence or the presence of any parts or any elements since, through the presence or the introduction of a new substantial form, every part comes to exist with a greater or fuller nature which, now, properly belongs to it. Cf. http://thomasaquinas.edu/sites/default/files/goyettel.pdf (accessed June 27, 2012).

Merely from an assemblage, a collection, a grouping, or a conglomeration of parts or elements, a substance or a thing cannot be brought into being. With respect to substances or things (substances or things which exist as compound substances or things), its constitutive elements or its constitutive principles always exist together in a manner which points to a form or a species of mutual dependence (or some kind of mutual causality) which would exist among the different elements or parts. No one element or no one part enjoys any kind of priority or any kind of value which surpasses that which belongs to any of the other elements or parts. In order to understand thus how or why a set of interlocking elements exists in the kind of manner which they happen to have in a given context, we must thus always refer to a specification of meaning and being which refers to the form or the being of a substance or thing. “A substance [or thing] is a whole, which is simultaneously complex and irreducibly one.” Cf. D. C. Schindler, “Giving Cause to Wonder,” The Catholicity of Reason (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdsman Publishing Company, 2014), p. 154. Molecules, according to our scientific knowledge of them, always exist as the smallest of things or as the smallest of substances. They cannot be further divided into parts without destroying the intelligible unity which defines the nature or the character of their being: the intelligibility which properly belongs to that which exists as a thing or substance. By way of a simple example, a single molecule of water exists as a bonding of H2O (one oxygen atom being joined to two hydrogen atoms). But, as soon as we attempt any division into parts, we would no longer have the kind of unity which is constituted by how an oxygen atom has been bonded to two hydrogen atoms to form a single unit of water. That which had existed as water would no longer exist as water. We would no longer have a thing or substance which would exist as water.

transubstantiation, we refer to how this change occurs in a manner which is entirely proper to it and which is not to be confused with other possible theories and designations that have been used at times to try to speak about the kind of change which allegedly occur within the context of Mass and the celebration of the Church's Eucharist. The use of other theories suggests that some other kind of change is being talked about or, alternatively, it can also suggest that that which exists as a change within the Eucharist is being given an explanation which goes beyond or which supposedly surpasses that which had been previously understood by us where the terms of reference are determined by the kind of meaning which exists in the teaching about transubstantiation.

by way of summary

To conclude, as we have noted, an entirely adequate understanding of transubstantiation supposes an inquiry that attends to a rather large number of different variables that need to be distinguished from each other and, at the same time, all related to each other. However, if, at this point, we are allowed to speak in general terms, we can say (or perhaps we should say) that the teaching that we have about the transubstantiation of consecrated bread and wine is to be viewed as an articulation or as a specification of meaning whose base or ground is a philosophy of being which is to be equated with a metaphysics of being – a metaphysics which is quite other than a philosophy of being which is determined by a metaphysics of form or by what we would tend to refer to as a metaphysics of meaning. Form and meaning go together here. We associate form with Aristotle and meaning with a tradition that comes to us from 19th Century German philosophy and the work of Wilhelm Dilthey (d. 1911). Where, in Aristotle, it is alleged that a metaphysics of form is to be distinguished as a philosophy of being (Aristotle believes in the primacy of form, being is explained by form, the ingress of form), in Aquinas, it is alleged that, instead of a metaphysics of form, we have a metaphysics of act. Act transcends form

---

52 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 3a, q. 78, a. 4, ad 3: “The words, through which the consecration takes place, work sacramentally; therefore the power of changing, which is in the forms of these sacraments, follows upon the signification,” as cited by Abbot Vonier, *A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist* (Bethesda: Zaccheus Press, 2003), p. 65.

53 To understand better why we would say that the whole substance of bread and wine is replaced by the substance of Christ's body and blood, we can perhaps advert to the principle of contradiction as this is known to exist for us as a basic principle within the formulae of deductive logic. Something cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same way in the same place. Contradictory statements are to be regarded as irrational expressions of meaning (the contradiction points to an absence of meaning) and so they are not to be held, accepted, or believed by anyone who claims or thinks that he or she is behaving in a reasonable, rational way. Hence, if we take this principle and if we apply it to the Church's teaching about the meaning of transubstantiation, if a substance is changed and if it is no longer that which it was before, we cannot say that it continues to be that which it once was as a substance. The change is complete. That which is the reality of bread and wine does not exist at the same time in the same place as the reality of Christ's body and blood. A theory of change which thinks in terms of consubstantiation cannot be affirmed as a truth which merits our rational human belief.

54 Peter Beer, p. 55; p. 60.


56 Beer, p. 61.
and the being of anything which exists is explained if we move from form to act.

These matters aside however, if we take the Church's traditional teaching as this has come down to us about the Real Presence of Christ within the Eucharist, it can be argued that, in transubstantiation, the Church's traditional teaching has been taken and it has been transposed or put into words and phrases that are derived from a basic set of metaphysical components that are fundamental and always operative if we are to understand the kind of proportion or the ordered relation of elements which is always constitutive of anything which happens to exist within our world. In a metaphysics of act (as we move from potency to form and then from form to act), a preliminary understanding is given to us about that which exists as the being of things or the reality of things. A metaphysics of act is to be associated with a general science or a philosophy which refers to a metaphysics of being or a metaphysics of reality. Bluntly put, if anything is known to exist by us through a self-transcending order of acts which is constitutive of our human cognition, it must always exist as a tripartite compound of potency, form, and act. Three kinds of being can be accordingly distinguished. Three kinds of being exist if we refer to that which exists as potential being, that which exists as formal being (or as intelligible being or intelligibility), and that which exists as actual being or real being. Differentiations pertaining to potency, form, and act point to realizations of being that must move from potency to form or intelligibility and then, from there, toward act, being, or reality (from form to act, being, or reality).

Hence, when we turn to the Church's theology and if we shift into analogical acts of understanding that are proper to our acts of understanding within the discipline of theology (given that a direct understanding of divine things is not given to us within our current life as thinking, knowing human subjects), if then, at some point and for various reasons of one kind or another, a received teaching of the Church is questioned and if it is turned into a focus of dispute and controversy (perhaps, to some extent, we can say that it is doubted by some), then, for a solution, we can ask if the right and proper solution is a transposition of meaning which we can try to attempt. Here, we take the wording of a commonly received teaching (as it has come down to us) and, by posing specifically metaphysical questions, we can put these words into a new form or into a new mode of expression which is determined by a new way of thinking and understanding which differs from commonsense apprehensions of meaning that have been experienced and known by us in a context which always favors a use of symbolic language and the ambiguous type of reference which belongs to the imagery and the suggestiveness of our symbolic language. Hence, with respect to the Church's teaching about the Eucharist and the kind of change which is believed to occur within the Eucharist, if a crude physicalist interpretation of Christ's Real Presence in the Eucharist is to be avoided in the understanding and teaching of Christian believers and if, at the same time, the reality of Christ's presence is to be upheld and taught in a more convincing way, then the best means appears to be a manner of articulation and statement which knows that apprehensions of reality are best given to us (they are best experienced by us) if we can move into our acts of understanding and if we can attend to the kind of intelligibility which exists if it is solely determined by that which is given to us through our various acts of understanding (in contrast to that which could be given to us through our various acts of human sensing). Changes in reality properly refer to changes in intelligibility as these can be known by us through our direct acts of human understanding which are then judged or evaluated by us through the understanding which we can have and which is given to us in our reflective acts of understanding. Changes in intelligibility always imply or lead to changes that occur within the order of real things.

57See Ott, pp. 375-378, on “The Real Presence [of Christ's Body and Blood] according to the Testimony of Tradition.”
(being). One leads to the other. Hence, to associate the kind of change which occurs in the Eucharist with a physical change, a sensible change, or a material type of change is to work with an order of signification which is grounded in how things are given to us through our various acts of sense and the unfortunate result is a truncation in the extent of our understanding. However, if we should turn to our experience of self and enter into a discipline that is interested in self-understanding, then, through our acts of self-understanding, we should begin to realize that, if we work from determinations of meaning that are solely determined by the givens that belong to us our various acts of sense, we will never move toward a clarification of meaning and being that is conditioned by the requirements of intelligibility and the shift which occurs whenever we move from acts of sensing as a lower order of cognitive act toward acts of understanding as a higher order of cognitive act.

As a consequence thus, in the teaching that we have about transubstantiation that is given to us by the Church, we are presented with a species of teaching and an exactness in explanation which protects us from the temptations of possibly falling into doctrinal error. In transubstantiation, we can speak about our belief in the reality of Christ's Real Presence in the Eucharist and, at the same time, we realize or we admit that the articulation of this teaching moves us from a commonsense way of thinking and speaking into a technical or a philosophical way of thinking and speaking. In other words, if, in our lives and in our consciousness, we are to be penetrated by the truth of the Church's teaching, this is best done (it is best encouraged) if we can express the Church's faith in a manner that is not limited to our ordinary ways of thinking and speaking. The faith turns into a larger, greater, or more luminous thing if it can be expressed through a plurality of ways and means that all fundamentally agree with each other although, for a grounding that cuts across cultural differences and differing circumstances of time and space, we best work with an understanding which is shaped by the order or the structure of reality and the proportionate order which exists within the self-transcendence of our human cognition. By her teaching (the Church's teaching), through the doctrine of transubstantiation, the Real Presence of Christ is presented to us and it is explained to us in a manner which prescinds from the influence of subjective human conditions since, in transubstantiation, a change occurs which exists apart from that which human beings can do in their thinking and understanding. Words are spoken but, at Mass, these words repeat words which had been spoken by Our Lord himself when he had been present among us within the context of life within this world and these words, by divine institution, always effect that which they purport to bring about within the context of the Church's Eucharist. While, yes, it can be properly argued that the celebration of Mass should eventually lead or it should hopefully lead us toward a communion of the Church's faithful that is built up and which is constructed through the sacramental reception of Christ's body and blood, yet, before the possible experience of this kind of communion, before a sacramental communion is possible, Christ's Real Presence is already given to us (it is made present to us) on the tableau of the Church's altars and, from this presence, as a consequence of this presence, from it, everything else flows amongst us, within and among the life of faithful Christians. We say, on the one hand, that an ontological or a metaphysical presence conditions things or we say that it paves the way for us, leading us toward a possible turning of hearts and minds that is directed toward communion with God which, at Mass, becomes more complete or full - a communion, however, which promises or points to a third form of communion that can be given to us in a life that has yet to come and a new species of communion that promises to be everlasting, entirely without end.

However, even as we admit that, in this case, a theoretical specification of meaning about change within the Christian Eucharist restates inherited Catholic belief and meaning in a fashion which is noticeably more clear and less ambiguous, a note of caution or a note of warning needs to be sounded lest we are tempted to think about the manner of Christ's presence in a way which does not differ from
how we think, understand, or speak about how other realities exist within our concretely existing world. As we have noted, in the work of theology, we take a philosophic meaning (a philosophic theory or a philosophic explanation) and, in some way, we apply it within a theological context. Our object is a theological form of understanding and, from this, a theological form of statement. As also we have noted, in the work of theology, we work with analogical acts of understanding because no divine thing can be understood by us in a way that is akin to how we understand anything which exists within the context of spatial temporal world, using our acts of sensing in combination with our various acts of understanding (acts of reflective understanding following acts of direct understanding). The Church teaches us that, for a fuller explanation about what happens at Mass with respect to what happens in transubstantiation, we must refer to a special primary causality which refers to the power of God (the intelligent omnipotence of God) which exists as a transcendent power or as a transcendent source of activity (relative to the things of this world). This power, as a first cause, works in an ordinary way through naturally existing things (or through naturally existing causes) that exist within our naturally existing world and which exist as parts or elements which belong together in a natural or a cosmic order of things which exists within our world and which refers to the universe of things. However, at the same time, within the context of the Church's Eucharist (and the other sacraments of the Church), this power, as a first cause, works in an extraordinary way through things which exist largely within a human order of things but which have been taken up and put into a new order of things or a new repetitive scheme of things which pertains now to an order of salvation and redemption and a recurrent meeting of goals and purposes which transcend the kind of order which we find among the order of created things.

In other words, an analogical understanding of things attempts to speak about the kind of causality which belongs to the things of God and an order of meaning and being which differs from anything that is known by us within the context of our incarnate earthly life. And so, if God's transcendence is to be respected, if the otherness of God is to be maintained in a way which totally differs from the kind of otherness that exists both within our naturally existing world and within our humanly existing world, then, within this larger context of meaning and being, our analogical and theological ways of thinking and speaking have always to be distinguished from a univocal way of thinking and speaking which assumes that “because being [as a predicate] is common to all that exists,...[therefore being] must be conceived as pertaining to God in the same manner as it pertains to all creatures [which exist] in the natural world.” If the transcendence of God is not adverted to, if this transcendence is overlooked or if it is forgotten or neglected in some way, then, too easily or too readily we will fall into a way of thinking and conceiving which assumes that God and creation share in the same kind of existence which, allegedly, belongs to both of them or that they are informed by the same kind of predicate that, allegedly, we all have as existing, distinct beings. We admit here that, yes, God exists and we also admit that, yes, created things exist. You and I both exist. And so, if both types of being exist, if in fact both really and truly are, then we tend to assume or we tend to believe that both would seem to share in the same meaning that allegedly belongs to existence: in other words, what it means to exist. We create a framework or a perspective which attempts to bring God into a relation with the universe that we

58See http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/lateran4.asp (accessed March 24, 2015), citing Canon 1, Fourth Lateran Council, 1215.

experience and know in a way which conceives of him as belonging to the fabric of our world (God is but a part of our world or God is a part of our universe). God becomes the highest being or he becomes the highest type of being who exists within the order of our world and so, as a consequence of this kind of thinking, God's transcendence loses the absoluteness which properly belongs to it (relative to the being of every other kind of thing) since now, within this altered scheme of things, God ceases to be entirely other than the world or the universe which he has brought into being ex nihilo (out of nothing).

Hence, when God is seen as a part of our world, if God exists “at the top of things” (so to speak), then, as a consequence of this new way of thinking, it would follow from this that we will encounter problems when we would like to speak about how God exists within our world or if we should ask whether God exists within our world. God's transcendence has been lessened to a certain extent. No one denies this. Yet, at the same time too, God's presence or God's imminence is less that what it had been since, if God exists at a distance from us, far away at a level of being which exists as the highest of possible levels (God is removed from us), then, we cannot so easily say that God is present to us in any kind of immediate way within the context of our current life as we are surrounded by the circumstances of our ordinary existence. God is less imminent within our world and, at the same time too, God is less transcendent with respect to the being of our world. Or, in another way of speaking, God is not quite one nor the other. He cannot be absolutely transcendent and he cannot be absolutely imminent since, in his being, he ceases to exist in a way which is totally different than the kind of being and existence which exists when we refer to the order of secondary causes and the kind of causality which belongs to the order of secondary causes. In other words, if we take away or if we restrict the transcendence of God, if we fail to think about God in a way which conceives of him as a pure disembodied spirit (existing as an unrestricted pure spirit), we cannot think or speak about the reality of God's nearness or the reality of God's proximity within everything which exists within the created order of things as we think about the causality of secondary causes and the kind of work and play which belongs to the operation of secondary causes. God's immediate presence cannot be seen to exist for us (the proximity of God's presence cannot be known or acknowledged by us) within the proximity which also exists for us and which belongs to the proper order of secondary causes (even as we admit that the proximity of secondary causes differs from the proximity which belongs to the primary causality of God). Only from a point of view which refers to God's absolute transcendence, it is only within this context that it is possible for us to say that, because God is so transcendent, as a consequence, God can become completely immanent.⁶⁰ In a manner which analogous to what happens in the event and the happening of Christ's Incarnation, if God is able to be immanent within our world, God can also be present or immanent within the elements of consecrated bread and wine. In the kind of presence which exists within the Church's Eucharist, with respect to the manner of God's presence, in the occurring of transubstantiation, a completion is given to the history of Israel (a completion is given to the trajectory which belongs to the history of Israel and which is determinative of the sacred kind of history which belongs to the election and the life of God's Chosen People).

Hence, as a concluding note, when we think about the change which occurs in transubstantiation and when we also think about the absoluteness of God's transcendence, we now understand why, within this context, in relating transubstantiation with the reality of God's transcendence, a lack of contrariety is to be noticed and admitted. That which exists as a change within the Eucharist is a change which is entirely natural to the being of God. It is proportionate to the nature and the character of God's being (the manner of God's existence). But, at the same time too, this change which is natural for God is

---

supernatural with respect to how we exist as human beings and what we can do as human agents (as human subjects). As agents of change within the celebration of the Christian Eucharist, celebrating priests act in the person of Christ Our Lord. Through the offerings of priests, our human causality is taken up and, in a sacramental way, it is converted and turned into an incarnating specification of God's divine causality which, here, is specifically religious. The purpose is redemptive of being and not creative of being (technically speaking) and, in its own way, from the existence of a privation or from that which does not exist, something else is brought into being which before had not existed. An absence of salvation or the unavailability of our salvation is translated or it is replaced by a presence and an availability of salvation which, before, had not existed for us and which had not been known to us as a point of departure for a re-ordering of all things which exist within our world.